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The Propriety of Section lO(j) Bargaining Orders in
Gissel Situations
INTRODUCTION

Section IOG) of the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA) 1
authorizes the National Labor Relations Board (Board)2 to petition a
federal district court for temporary injunctive relief3 from the e.ffects
of unfair labor practices4 pending the Board's adjudication of those
practices.5 Congress provided this mechanism to relieve the harms
I. Labor-Management Relations Act §IO(i), 29 U.S.C. § 160(i) (1976), provides that:
The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint . . . charging that any person
has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition any United States
district court, within any district wherein the unfair labor practice in question is alleged to
have occurred or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. Upon the filing of any such petition the court shall
cause notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction
to grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and
proper.
Congress amended the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1976), with the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976), in 1947. This Note uses the abbreviations NLRA and LMRA interchangeably to denote the NLRA as amended by the LMRA.
2. "NLRB" denotes the administrative agency as a whole, while "Board" denotes the 5member adjudicatory branch of that agency.
3. The Board's petition must allege that (1) An alleged victim of an unfair labor practice
has filed a charge with a regional office of the NLRB; (2) the regional office, having investigated the charge and having found it to be meritorious, has issued a complaint; (3) the facts
presented support the charge; (4) the unfair labor practices are likely to continue unless restrained; (5) the federal district court has jurisdiction; and (6) the parties that the Board seeks
to restrain are subject to the LMRA. See D. McDOWELL & K. HUHN, NLRB REMEDll!S FOR
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 252-55 (1976).
4. Section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), guarantees employees certain rights.
Section 8(a)(I) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(l) (1976), protects those rights by making it
unlawful for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in [§) 157 . . . ." This section of the NLRA designates such unlawful conduct as "unfair labor practices."
Among the employees' § 7 rights are the right to form or join a union and the right to
bargain collectively through representatives of the employees' choosing. Thus, if the Board
has certified a union as the representative of the employees in a bargaining unit, see notes 3839 infra,§ 1 guarantees those employees the right to bargain with the employer through that
union. If the employer refuses to bargain with a duly certified union, it commits an unfair
labor practice in violation of NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA forbids an employer from discriminating "in regard to hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
5. The administrative proceedings follqwing the issuance of the regional office's complaint,
see note 3 supra, involve several steps. First, both sides present evidence and arguments to an
administrative law judge. The administrative law judge renders a written decision containing
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations for relief. Then, if either side takes
exception to the administrative law judge's decision, the Board reviews the record, renders its
decision, and issues an order. The order may adopt, modify, or reject the findings and recommendations of the administrative law judge. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.12 (1983);see also Nolan &
Lehr, Improving NLRB Unfair Labor Practices Procedures, 51 TEX. L. REV. 47, 48-50 (1979),
Finally, since the Board's order is not self-enforcing, the refusal of either party to comply with
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caused by the delay inherent in the Board's adjudicative processes. 6
A federal district court petitioned by the Board pursuant to section
lOG) may grant such temporary relief "as it deems just and proper."7
One situation in which section lOG) relief may be useful occurs
where the Board petitions for a bargaining order pending its disposition of an unfair labor practices claim like the one presented in
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. 8 In Gissel, the Supreme Court upheld a
Board order requiring collective bargaining where the employer had
committed unfair labor practices that were so severe that a fair representational election was no longer possible.9 Although the Board·
itself has the authority to order bargaining even if the union has not
won a representational election, 10 the question remains whether a
federal district court may issue a temporary bargaining order pending the Board's final decision. An NLRB Regional Director will
seek such an order in a classic Gissel situation: where a majority of
employees sign cards authorizing the union to represent them, and
the employer allegedly responds by committing unfair labor practices.11 The desired injunction, which this Note will refer to as a
the order means that the Board must petition a federal appellate court for an order enforcing
its decision. See id.
6. In fiscal year 1977, the median time that elapsed between the filing of a charge and the
Board's decision was 385 days. Nolan & Lehr, supra note 5, at 50. It takes another year for the
Board to obtain enforcement from the appellate court. Id. at 51; see also note 25 i'!fra.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1976); see note l supra.
8. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
9. 395 U.S. at 610-16. This note will refer to such Board orders as "Gissel bargaining
orders."
10. The Board can order an employer to bargain collectively with a union certified as the
exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. See NLRA
§ lO(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976); notes 35-37 i'!fra and accompanying text. The Board makes
such an order after certifying the union through the electoral process, see notes 38-39 i'!fra,
and after determining in its adjudicatory proceedings that the employer has violated § 8(a)(5)
of the NLRA. See notes 4-5 supra.
In addition, the Supreme Court has upheld the Board's authority to order bargaining pursuant to § 10(c) of the NLRA in the absence of a union victory in a representational election.
The Board may order bargaining if, in its adjudicatory proceedings, it determines that (1) a
majority of the employees signed valid authorization cards and (2) the employer's unfair labor
practices after the signing of the cards made a fair election or rerun election unlikely. Gissel,
395 U.S. at 610-16 (1969); see notes 41-46 i'!fra and accompanying text.
Under Gissel, the employer's violations of§§ 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(3) trigger the employer's obligation to bargain. Elm Hill Meats of Owensboro, Inc., 213 N.L.R.B. 874, 874-75 (1974);
Steel-Fab, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. 363, 363-65 (1974); accord Bandag, Inc. v. NLRB, 583 F.2d 765,
770-71 (5th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 554 F.2d 996, 1002-03 (10th
Cir. 1977). The Board will also issue Gissel bargaining orders to remedy violations of
§ 8(a)(5). See Trading Port, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 298, 301 (1975); note 4 supra.
11. The Board, acting on the reco=endation of the Office of General Counsel, authorizes
a Regional Director to petition for§ lO(j) relief. 29 C.F.R. § 101.37 (1983). In petitioning the
district court, the Regional Director acts as an agent of the General Counsel, the head of the
NLRB's prosecutorial branch. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1976); NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND STATEMENTS OF PROCEDURE, §202, at 316 (1979).
Thus, in a § l0(j) proceeding, the Regional Director acts under the auspices of the
prosecutorial rather than the adjudicatory branch of the NLRB.
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section IOG) bargaining order, requires the employer to bargain with
the union until the Board adjudicates the case.
The courts have split on the question of whether a bargaining
order constitutes ''just and proper" relief under section IOG). 12 This
Note contends that such an order is always just in a Gissel situation
but that a district court may properly issue one only in situations
where the Board's prior decisions clearly establish the relevant labor
policy and indicate a high probability that the Board will eventually
issue a Gissel bargaining order. Part I of the Note develops the criteria relevant to determining what kind of temporary relief is "just."
Although section 1OG) does not itself define these criteria, the courts
may tum to the goals of the LMRA for assistance. Part I relies on
these goals to conclude that a court should issue an appropriate section IOG) order if a union would otherwise suffer irreparable injury
between the time an employer commits unfair labor practices and
the time the Board adjudicates those practices.
Part II applies this principle and concludes that the section 1O(j)
bargaining order is always just and sometimes proper in Gissel situations. The order is just because it prevents the affected union from
suffering irreparable injury while imposing only remediable side effects on other parties. The order is proper only where clearly established labor policy indicates a high probability that the Board will
subsequently issue a Gissel bargaining order.

I.

CRITERIA FOR SECTION

10(1)

RELIEF

A. The Reasonable Cause Standard
Section IOG) permits a district court to issue a temporary injunction only if the requested relief would be ''just and proper." 13 Before
deciding whether the injunction would be just and proper, however,
the courts require the petitioner to show "reasonable cause to believe
that unfair labor practices have occurred." 14
12. Several courts have concluded that§ IO(i) bargaining orders are just and proper. See
Seeler ex rel. NLRB v. Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1975); Wilson v. Liberty
Homes, Inc., 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2688 (W.D. Wis. 1980), order vacated as moot and opinion
withdrawn as moot, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2492 (7th Cir. 1982); Hirsch ex rel. NLRB v. Trim
Lean Meat Prods., 479 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Del. 1979); Gottfried ex rel. NLRB v. Mayco Plastics, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. Mich. 1979), affd. mem., 615 F.2d 1360 (6th Cir. 1980);
Smith v. Old Angus, Inc., 81 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2936 (D. Md. 1972).
Other courts have reached the opposite conclusion. See Boire ex rel. NLRB v. Pilot
Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976); Wilson
ex rel. NLRB v. Hart Ski Mfg. Co., 472 F. Supp. 484 (D. Minn. 1979), vacated as moot, 617
F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1980); Fuchs ex rel. NLRB v. Steel-Fab, Inc., 356 F.Supp. 385 (D. Mass.
1973); Great Chinese-American Sewing Co.• 227 N.L.R.B. 1670 (1977), affd., 578 F.2d 251 (9th
Cir. 1978); Newton Joseph, 225 N.L.R.B. 294 (1976). In those last two cases, the decision
denying the§ IO(j) order was not reported. Pettibone, The Sec. JO(j) Bargaining Order in Gissell-Type Cases, 27 LAB. L.J. 648, 655 n.42 (1976).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1976); see note I supra.
14. Section 10(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1976), is the source of the reasonable
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The section 1OG) petitioner must first allege that unfair labor
practices have occurred. 15 Such an allegation poses two questions: a
question of fact and a question of policy. The factual issue requires
an examination of certain events and of the conduct of the party
charged with unfair labor practices. The policy issue requires a prescriptive judgment as to whether the conduct in question should constitute unfair labor practices. 16
The reasonable cause standard poses a relatively light burden of
proof for the facts in issue, and it requires that courts defer to the
policy decision reached by the prosecutorial branch of the NLRB. 17
The petitioner's factual determinations need only be "within the
range of rationality," 18 and his policy decision merely must not be
"insubstantial or frivolous" . 19 Given the Board's stringent screening
cause standard for§ 100) proceedings. Section 10(1) requires a Regional Director to petition a
United States district court for injunctive relief if a preliminary investigation gives the Director
"reasonable cause to believe" that_ secondary boycotts are occurring.
The courts that have considered § 100) petitions have been unanimous in applying the
§ JO(!) reasonable cause standard to § 100) proceedings. See, e.g., Fuchs ex rel. NLRB v.
Hood Indus., 590 F.2d 395, 397 (1st Cir. 1979); Squillacote ex rel. NLRB v. Local 248, Meat &
Allied Food Workers, 534 F.2d 735, 743 (7th Cir. 1976); Hirsch ex rel. NLRB v. Building and
Constr. Trades Council, 530 F.2d 298, 302 (3d Cir. 1976); Eisenberg ex rel. NLRB v. Hartz
Mountain Corp., 519 F.2d 138, 140-41 (3d Cir. 1975); Seeler ex rel. NLRB v. Trading Port,
Inc., 517 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1975); Boire ex rel. NLRB v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. (5th Cir.
1975), 515 F.2d 1185, 1189, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976); Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co.
v. Meter ex rel. NLRB, 385 F.2d 265, 269 (8th Cir. 1967); Angle v. Sacks ex rel. NLRB, 382
F.2d 655, 660 (10th Cir. 1967).
15. See note 3 supra.
16. Because the Board has heard so many cases involving unfair labor practices, it has in a
wide range of circumstances established the type of conduct that constitutes unfair labor practices. Thus, the crucial question will be factual. The court should refuse to issue a temporary
bargaining order if the § 100) petitioner alleges conduct the legality of which has never betjn
determined by the Board under § S(a). See notes 130-36 infra and accompanying text.
:
17. For a brief discussion of the NLRB's prosecutorial capacity, see note 11 supra.
18. Danielson ex rel. NLRB v. Joint Bd. of Coat, Suit and Allied Garment Workers'
Union, 494 F.2d 1230, 1245 (2d Cir. 1974) ("the Regional Director may [resolve issues] in
favor of the charge [of unfair labor practices] and the district court should sustain him if his
choice is within the range of rationality"); accord Kaynard ex rel. NLRB v. Mego Corp., 633
F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir. 1980) (§ 100)); Fuchs ex rel. NLRB v. Hood Indus., 590 F.2d 395, 397
(1st Cir. 1979); Squillacote ex rel. NLRB v. Graphic Arts Intl. Union, 540 F.2d 853, 860 (7th
Cir. 1976) ("(C]ourt's function is limited to a determination of whether contested factual issues
could ultimately be resolved by the Board in favor of the General Counsel."); Seeler ex rel.
NLRB v. Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1975) (If disputed issues of fact arise, "the
Regional Director should be given the benefit of the doubt in a proceeding for§ 100) relief.").
The presumptions favoring the petitioner on disputed issues of fact and inferences from those
facts have led two courts examining § 100) petitions to describe the burden imposed by the
reasonable cause standard as "relatively insubstantial." Levine ex rel. NLRB v. C & W Mining Co., 610 F.2d 432,435 (6th Cir. 1979); Hirsch ex rel. NLRB v. Building and Constr. Trades
Council, 530 F.2d 298, 302 (3d Cir. 1976).
19. See, e.g., Hendrix ex rel. NLRB v. International Union of Operating Engrs., 592 F.2d
437,442 (8th Cir. 1979); Squillacoteex rel. NLRB v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d
31, 34 (7th Cir. 1977); Hirsch ex rel. NLRB v. Building and Constr. Trade Council, 530 F.2d
298,302 (3d Cir. 1976); Boireex rel. NLRB v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1189,
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976); Boire ex rel. NLRB v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 479
F.2d 778, 789-92 (5th Cir. 1973) (§ 100)); San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild v. Ken-
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procedures for unfair labor practices that merit section IOG) relief, 20
the existence of a section lOG) petition in a Gissel situation virtually
guarantees that the reasonable cause standard will be satisfied. 21
Once the district court has found reasonable cause to believe that
unfair labor practices have occurred, the next question is whether the
proposed section lOG) remedy would be ''just and proper."

B. The Just and Proper Standard
The NLRA authorizes the Board to remedy unfair labor practices.22 But because of the delay inherent in the Board's adjudication
process, 23 the final order for relief may not adequately remedy the
injury produced by those practices.24 Congress enacted section lOG)
to prevent irreparable harm from developing in the interim between
the commission of unfair labor practices and the issuance of the
nedy ex rel. NLRB, 412 F.2d 541, 544 (9th Cir. 1969); see also Silverman ex rel. NLRB v. 4041 Realty Assocs., 668 F.2d 678, 681 (2d Cir. 1982).
20. See note 134 iefra. The Board uses eight factors to determine whether to petition for
I0G) relief, including:
a. the clarity of the alleged violations;
d. whether the unfair labor practices create special remedy problems so that it would
probably be impossible either to restore the status quo or effectively dissipate the consequences of the unfair labor practices through resort solely to the regular procedures provided in the Act for Board order and subsequent enforcement proceedings;
e. whether the unfair labor practices involve interference with the conduct of an election or constitute a clear and flagrant disregard of Board certification of a bargaining
representative or other Board procedures;
f. whether the continuation of the alleged unfair labor practices will result in exceptional hardship to the charging party; [and]
g. whether the current unfair labor practice is of a continuing or repetitious
pattern. . . .
NLRB, CASEHANDLING MANUAL~ 10310.2 (1983).
21. The Board's guidelines have led it to petition for § I0G) relief only where the employer's conduct, if proved, would clearly constitute unfair labor practices. Even courts denying § lOG) bargaining orders have found reasonable cause to believe that unfair labor practices
have occurred. See Boire ex rel NLRB v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 934 (1976); Fuchs ex rel NLRB v. Steel-Fab, Inc., 356 F.
Supp. 385, 387 (D. Mass. 1973); Kaynard v. Lawrence Rigging, Inc., 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2600,
2602 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). Moreover, the Board ultimately issued a Gissel bargaining order in
each of these cases. See note 134 iefra.
The court considering the § IOG) petition can also usually tum to the record compiled in
the hearings before the administrative law judge in order to determine the existence of unfair
labor practices. See note 136 iefra. This record is the one from which the Board makes the
ultimate determination on the existence of unfair labor practice. See 5 U.S.C. § 556 (e) (1976)
(hearing record is "the exclusive record for decision in accordance with [§] 557 of this title"); 5
U.S.C. § 557 (a)-(c) (1976).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976); see San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236 (1959); cases cited in notes 50 & 69 iefra.
23. See note 6 supra.
24. Because the Board has remedial power, its final order will be ineffective only if irremediable harm - harm that cannot be repaired by the Board's final order - occurs in the interval between the unfair labor practices and the issuance of that order. Harm that cannot be
remedied by the agency that exercises the relevant remedial power is, by definition, irreparable
harm.
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Board's final order.25 To ensure that this Congressional design is put
into effect, a district court considering a section lO(j) petition must
25. In discussing the interval between the issuance of the Board's order and a subsequent
judicial enforcement decree, Congress clearly recognized the possibility of interim harm and
the concomitant inadequacy of final relief:
Time is usually of the essence in these matters [disputes involving alleged unfair labor
practices), and consequently the relatively slow procedure of the Board hearing and order,
followed many months later by an enforcing decree of the circuit court of appeals, falls
short of achieving the desired objective-the prompt elimination of the obstructions to the
free flow of co=erce and encouragement of the practice and procedure of free and private collective bargaining. Hence we have provided that the Board, acting in the public
interest and not in vindication of purely private rights, may seek injunctive relief in the
case of all types of unfair labor practices . . . -.
Experience under the National Labor Relations Act has demonstrated that by reason
of lengthy hearings and litigation enforcing its orders, the Board has not been able in
some instances to correct unfair labor practices until after substantial injury has been
done. Under the present act the Board is empowered to seek interim relief only after it
has filed in the appropriate circuit court of appeals its order and the record on which it is
based. Since the Board's orders are not self-enforcing, it has sometimes been possible for
persons violating the act to accomplish their unlawful objective before being placed under
any legal restraint and thereby to make it impossible or not feasible to restore or preserve
the status quo pending litigation.
SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PuBLIC WELFARE, FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1947,
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 27, reprinted in 1 NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 1947, at 414, 433 (1947) [hereinafter cited as s.
REP. No. 105, reprinted in LEGLISLATIVE HISTORY, LMRA).
The legislative history's emphasis on preserving the status quo reinforces the conclusion
that Congress intended § lO(j) to prevent irreparable harm pending the Board's adjudication.
To prevent similar harm from occurring during the period pending judicial enforcement of the
Board's orders, Congress authorized the Board to petition the appellate courts for temporary
relief. LMRA § lO(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976); see also S. REP. No. 105 at 27, reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, LMRA at 433, supra. In the§ IO(e) setting, the Board's order establishes the status quo by establishing the legal relations among the parties. Section 10(e) is
designed to restore this arrangement pending an enforcement decree by vesting an appellate
court, in language identical to that contained in § lO(j), with the "power to grant such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper . . . ." To the extent that the judicial enforcement decree cannot reestablish the § 10(e) status quo, the Board's order has lost its
effectiveness - that is, irreparable harm has occurred.
Preserving the status quo is the goal of § IO(j) relief as well. Congress recognized that
harm could also occur pending the Board's adjudication:
By [§] IO(j), the Board is authorized . . . to petition the appropriate district court for
temporary relief or restraining order. Thus the Board need not wait, if the circumstances
call for such relief, until it has held a hearing, issued its order, and petitioned for enforcement of its order.
REP. No. 105, at 27, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, LMRA, at 433, supra. Thus, Congress demarcated two intervals of time: the interval between the unfair labor practices and
their adjudication by the Board, and the interval between the Board's decision and the court's
enforcement decree. Congress designed§ lO(e) to prevent irreparable harm from occurring in
the second interval and § IO(j) to prevent harm from occurring in the first. Congress' intent to
prevent harm that would render the Board's order ineffective shows its intent to prevent irreparable interim harm. A judicial decree enforcing the Board's order would be useless if irreparable harm had already destroyed the effectiveness of the order. And the Board's order would
itself be useless if irreparable harm occurred before it could be issued. See note 24 supra; cf.
Sachs ex rel. NLRB v. Davis & Hemphill, Inc., 71 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2126 (4th Cir. 1969),
opinion withdrawn and case dismissed as moot, 72 L.R.R.M. (BNA) (4th Cir. 1969) (holding
that since the language in the two sections was identical, the standards for just and proper
relief under§ lO(e) were the same as those under§ IO(j)); NLRB v. Aerovox Corp. of Myrtle
Beach, S.C., 389 F.2d 475, 476-77 (4th Cir. 1967) (same).

s.
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act to prevent irreparable injury in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the Board's remedial order.
The district court should evaluate the potential effectiveness of
the Board's Gissel order by referring to the goals that Congress set
forth in the NLRA. The Board's final order will be ineffective if it
fails to promote the free flow of commerce and to protect the collective bargaining process.26 Because the public has an interest in the
free flow of commerce, and because the free flow of commerce is one
of the statutory policies that Congress intended section IOG) to protect, courts must weigh this factor in their evaluation of section 1OG)
petitions.27 Congress also designed section IOG) to protect the statutory preference for collective bargaining. Therefore, the district
court must also consider the interests of the employer, the employees, and the union in determining whether the Board's final order
will be effective.28 Taken together, these goals help to define the
26. "The free flow of commerce" and "the practice and procedure of collective bargaining," are the goals that Congress designed the NLRA to achieve:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the cause of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these
obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own chooosing, for the
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid
or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976); see also NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257
(1939) ("[T]he fundamental policy of the Act is to safeguard the rights of self-organization and
collective bargaining, and thus by the promotion of industrial peace to remove obstructions to
the free flow of commerce as defined in the Act.").
27. Congress has defined the interest of the public coextensively with the policy of the
NLRA to promote the free flow of commerce:
Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices . . . have the intent or necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce . • . through . • . concerted activities
which impair the interest of the public in the free flow of such commerce.••.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). The fact that Congress equated the public interest with the free flow of
commerce helps explain why it indicated in the legislative history of§ IOG) "that the Board,
acting in the public interest and not in vindication of purely private rights, may seek injunctive
relief in the case of all types of unfair labor practices . . . ." S. REP. No. 105, at 8,reprinled in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, LMRA, at 414, supra note 24. A court acting to vindicate "purely"
private interests would ignore the public's interest in the free flow of commerce. See S. REP,
No. 105, at 8,reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, LMRA at 414,supra note 25. But the legislative directive not to act in vindication of "purely private rights" does not logically require the
court to act to the exclusion of private rights. Such exclusion would be inappropriate given
Congress' apparent intent to include the interests of the employer, the employees, and the
union - the parties affected by collective bargaining - in the § IOU) balance.
28. Congress has recognized that the rights and interests of the parties affected by collective bargaining are intertwined with the statutory policy to promote the collective bargaining
process itself:
It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to promote the full flow of commerce,
lo prescribe lhe legilimale rights ofboth employees and employers in their relations affecting
commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by
either with the legitimate rights of the other, lo protect the rights ofindividual employees in
their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce, to define and
proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which affect commerce and are
inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in connection with
labor disputes affecting commerce.
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scope of a section IOG) order.
The Board's final order will often be ineffective in a Gissel situation. This result follows because the employer's unfair labor practices erode union support during the interim between their
commission and their adjudication by the Board. The Supreme
Court acknowledged that this injury could be irreparable if left
unchecked:
If an employer has succeeded in undermining a union's strength . . .
he may see no need to violate a cease-and-desist order by further unlawful activity. The damage will have been done, and perhaps the only
fair way to effectuate employee rights is to re-establish the conditions
as they existed before the employer's unlawful campaign.29

The occurrence of this interim irreparable harm could impair effective collective bargaining and the free fl.ow of commerce. The injury to the union may disrupt the collective bargaining process in
two ways. First, unremedied unfair labor practices might permanently cripple the union's bargaining position.3 For example, such
practices might prevent a union from using legally protected bargaining chips such as the threat of a strike. Second, the possibility
that this harm would occur might encourage an employer to commit
unfair labor practices in order to weaken employee support for the
union. 31 Unfair labor practices must be redressed and deterred in
order to offset these developments.
Even if the employer's unfair labor practices do not injure the
union's bargaining ability, they may well precipitate strikes that will
disrupt the free fl.ow of commerce. 32 An order redressing the injuries

°

29 U.S.C. § 14l{b) (1973) (emphasis added). Thus, Congress, in defining the scope of the collective bargaining process, also delimited the rights of the parties engaged in bargaining. Consequently, a court acts inconsistently if, in considering a § IO(j) petition, it seeks to protect the
collective bargaining process but fails to take those measures needed to protect from irreparable harm the parties involved in that bargaining. See cases cited in note 33 i,!fra.
29. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575,612 (1969). Similarly, the legislative history
of the NLRA reflects Congress' recognition that the final disposition of a case may be rendered
ineffective by procedural delays. See note 25 supra.
30. See notes 67-70 infra and accompanying text.
31. For example, even if the Board will eventually order the employer to reinstate a
wrongfully discharged employee with back pay, the back pay award might not offset the perceived gain to the employer in the form of deterring the employees from exercising their organizational rights.
32. In Lebus ex rel. NLRB v. Manning, Maxwell and Moore, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 702 (W.D.
La. 1963), the court, in granting a§ IO(j) bargaining order pending the Board's adjudication of
a § 8(a)(5) claim, observed that
the very fact that the [employer] is admittedly refusing to recognize and bargain with the
Union is the type of action which inevitably undermines the Union's status and leads to,
or tends to lead to, labor disputes and strikes. The basic purpose of the Act and of this
proceeding is to eliminate the cause of labor disputes which might have this undesirable
effect.
218 F. Supp. at 706 (emphasis in original).Accord Boire ex rel. NLRB v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 479 F.2d 778, 788 (5th Cir. 1973) ("If the Company decides to . . . await the final
determination of the Board in the pending cases, there will be wide-spread strike activity
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produced by these practices may prevent a strike if the relief comes
before the employees act. The court considering a section lOG) petition must determine whether injury to commerce or the bargaining
environment will accrue during the pendency of the Board's decision. If such harms would occur, the Congressional objectives embodied in the NLRA require that the court issue an appropriate
order under section lOG).
Although courts faced with this issue have used different Iangauge to describe the criteria for a section lOG) injunction, they have
adopted an approach consistent with the one developed in Part I of
this Note. The courts have recognized that section lOG) must be
used to ensure that the Board order will effectively accomplish the
goals of the NLRA and have generally held that section IOG) relief
should issue in cases that create "a reasonable apprehension that the
efficacy of the Board's final order may be nullified, or the administrative procedures will be rendered meaningless . . . ." 33 Thus, the
courts have concluded that section lOG) relief is appropriate where
against the [employer], which quite clearly would result in ... a significant decline in important public services.").
33. Angle v. Sacks ex rel NLRB, 382 F.2d 655,660 (10th Cir. 1967). In Angle, the Tenth
Circuit modified but affirmed a § IO(i) order requiring reinstatement of employees allegedly
discharged for supporting the union during an election campaign. Citing the legislative history
of§ IO(i), the Angle court noted that Congress had recognized "that the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act could be defeated in particular cases by the passage of time . . . ."
382 F.2d at 659. The court observed the need to weigh the harm to the parties to determine
whether the Board would be able to enter an effective order absent a temporary injunction. It
cited with approval the district court's link between the effectiveness of the Board's order and
the harm caused by the allegedly unlawful discharges: " '[A]ny order of the Board will be an
empty formality if, when finally issued, [the employer] has succeeded in destroying any employee interest or initiative in collective bargaining.' " 382 F.2d at 660. The appellate court
then recognized that the establishment of conditions under which the Board could enter an
effective order was the goal of § IO(i) relief:
We conclude that an order of reinstatement is a permissible exercise of the court's jurisdiction under the circumstances of the case at bar, for reinstatement will as nearly as is
now possible restore the conditions prevailing before the discharges and so prevent a frustration of the ultimate adminstrative action.
382 F.2d at 661. The court also acknowledged that "[p]reservation and restoration of the status
quo are ... appropriate considerations in granting temporary relief pending the determination of the issues by the Board." 382 F.2d at 660.
With the exception of the Third and Seventh Circuits, every other circuit to consider the
issue has cited the Angle court's formulation of the § IO(i) calculus with approval and has
adopted an equivalent one. See Boire ex rel. NLRB v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d
1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976); Seeler ex rel. NLRB v. Trading
Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33, 39 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[T]he district court has the power to order immediate bargaining to prevent irreparable harm to the union's position in the plant, to the adjudicatory machinery of the NLRB, and to the policy of the Act in favor of the free selection of
collective bargaining representatives."); Boire ex rel. NLRB v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 479 F.2d 778, 790 (5th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Aerovox Corp. of Myrtle Beach, S.C., 389
F.2d 475, 477 (4th Cir. 1967); Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Meter ex rel. NLRB, 385
F.2d 265, 270 (8th Cir. 1967); Gottfried ex rel. NLRB v. Mayco Plastics, Inc., 472 F. Supp.
1161, 1165 (E.D. Mich. 1979), qffd mem., 615 F.2d 1360 (6th Cir. 1980) ("the fact that§ IO(i)
was enacted is an indication that Congress desired courts to furnish relief at the appropriate
time and in an effective manner'').
Although the Seventh and Third Circuits have not relied on Angle, they have developed
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interim developments threaten to undermine the effectiveness of the
Board's final order. 34
standards consistent with its normative components. In Squillacote ex rel. NLRB v. Local 248,
Meat & Allied Food Workers, 534 F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 1976), the court stated
that courts should consider such factors as the need for an injunction to prevent frustration of the basic remedial purpose of the act and the degree to which the public interest is
affected by a continuing violation as well as more traditional equitable considerations
such as the need to restore the status quo ante or preserve the status quo.
534 F.2d at 744. The court's reference to "the need . . . to prevent frustration of the basic
remedial purpose of the act" is the same language that other circuits use in describing the
§ lO(j) calculus and incorporates as a criterion the need to ensure the effectiveness of the
Board's order. The phrase "public interest" may have two meanings. Broadly interpreted, it
could refer to the policies that Congress intended § I OG) to promote. See note 72 infra. Alternatively, the language might refer to the public interest in the free flow of co=erce. See note
26 supra. Even this narrower interpretation does not, however, produce a different § lO(j)
calculus by excluding the other policy that Congress designed § IO(j) to further, the process of
collective bargaining. The court referred not only to the "public interest" but to "more traditional equitable considerations," a phrase which should be read to include protection of the
collective bargaining process since harm to that process translates into harm to the parties. See
notes 28 supra & 72 infra (traditional equitable criteria for a temporary injunction include
weighing the threats of potential irreparable harm to petitioner and respondent). Indeed, the
Squillacote court expressly weighed the employees' interests under § 7 of the NLRA. See 534
F.2d at 744.
The Third Circuit has equated the meaning of 'just and proper'' with the meaning of "the
public interest" as that phrase is used in the legislative history of the LMRA. Eisenberg ex rel
NLRB v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 519 F.2d 138, 141-42 (3rd Cir. 1975); cf. note 25 supra (discussing legislative history). The court defined "the public interest" as coextensive with the
policies that Congress designed § IO(j) to promote: "It is a fundamental objective of our national labor relations legislation to promote wholesome and mutually acceptable labor relations and the settlement of labor disputes through collective bargaining between employees
and their employer." 519 F.2d at 142. The Third Circuit also includes in its§ IO(j) balance the
interests of the parties involved in the collective bargaining process and the preservation of the
status quo. Eisenberg ex rel NLRB v. Wellington Hall Nursing Home, 651 F.2d 902, 906-07
(3rd Cir. 1981.).
34. The conclusion that the courts agree on the appropriate criteria for § I O(j) relief despite
their use of different language to describe them contradicts the conventional wisdom about
§ IO(j). See, e.g., Note, The Case for Quick Relief: Use ef Section I0(j) efthe Labor-Management Relations Act in Discriminatory Discharge Cases, 56 IND. L. J. 515, 534-35, 537 (1981)
(five standards); Note, Section I0(j) ofthe National Labor Relations Act: A Legislative, Administrative and Judicial Look Al A Potentially Effective (Bui Seldom Used) Remedy, 18 SANTA
CLARA L. R.E.v. 1021, 1044 (1978) (three standards) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Look]; Note,
Section I0(j) ef the National Labor Relations Act: Increased Exercise ef Federal Jurisdiction
Over Labor Disputes, 49 U. C1N. L. R.E.v. 415, 422-23 (1980) (three standar\is) [hereinafter cited
as Increased Exercise]; Note, The Use ef Section I0(j) if the Lobor-Managemenl Relations Act
in Employer Refusal-To-Bargain Cases, 1976 U. ILL L.F. 845, 848 n.18 (five standards, which
"are very similar as applied"); Note, Union Authorization Cards: Linden's Peacemaking Polenllal, 83 YALE L.J. 1689, 1705 n.123 (1974) (at least two standards); Note, The Role if the Temporary Injunction in Reforming Labor Law Administration, 8 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 553,
568 n. 108 (1972) (three standards).
For example, co=entators have suggested that the Tenth and Eighth Circuits apply different standards. See, e.g., Increased Exercise, supra, at 422-23; Judicial Look, supra, at 104448. Both co=entators describe the Tenth Circuit's standard as "prevention of frustration of
the purposes of the NLRA." Increased Exercise, supra, at 422; Judicial Look, supra, at 1046.
They contrast this standard with the one used by the Eighth Circuit in Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co. v. Meter ex rel NLRB, 385 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1967), where the court observed that:
[T]emporary relief under[§) lO(j) cannot be activated and motivated solely by a finding of
"reasonable cause" to believe that a violation of the Act has occurred. More is required to
guide this permissive range of discretion. Section IO(j) is reserved for a more serious and
extraordinary set of circumstances where the unfair labor practices, unless contained,
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THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE SECTION lOG) BARGAINING
ORDER IN GISSEL SITUATIONS

Section lO(c) of the NLRA vests the Board with the authority to
remedy unfair labor practices by ordering the offending party to
cease and desist from its unlawful activities. 35 Some cease and desist
orders impose affirmative obligations on the employer. For example, the Board may order the employer to cease and desist from its
unlawful refusal to bargain with a union that the Board has duly
certified through the electoral process. 36 Such an order imposes on
the employer the duty to bargain in good faith. 37
A union can obtain recognition as the bargaining representative
of a group of employees through the Board's procedures for election
and certification.38 An election is not, however, the only mechanism
that can trigger an employer's obligation to bargain in good faith. 39
would have an adverse and deleterious effect on the rights of the aggrieved party which
could not be remedied through the normal Board channels.
385 F.2d at 270. Judicial Look inaccurately labels this approach as the "extraordinary circumstances standard." Judicial Look,supra, at 1045. Judicial Look errs by excluding the prescriptive language that follows the phrase "extraordinary set of circumstances." The language that
follows this phrase incorporates the same element - irreparable harm - that the Tenth Circuit uses in its calculus. Increased Exercise, while correctly observing that this standard in
effect requires irreparable harm, Increased Exercise, supra, at 432 n.52, incorrectly contrasts it
with the standard used by the Tenth Circuit. Increased Exercise, supra, at 422-23. As the
legislative histories of§§ IO(i) and IO(e) indicate, the purposes of the Act are frustrated if the
Board cannot enter an effective order. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. The Board
cannot enter an effective order if irreparable harm occurs before the order is issued. See id.
Therefore, irreparable harm pending the Board's order frustrates the purposes of the Act and
thus falls within the language used by the Tenth Circuit.
The argument that the Tenth and Eighth Circuits use different standards also leads to
inaccurate classification of the approaches used by other circuits. For example, both Increased
Exercise and Judicial Look indicate that the Fourth Circuit uses the same standard as the
Tenth. Increased Exercise,supra, at 422 n. 47;Judicial Look,supra, at 1046 n.117 & 1048. In
fact, the Fourth Circuit expressly noted that "[i]n adopting these standards, we follow the
Eight and Tenth Circuits which applied them to gauge the propriety of relief granted by district courts under§ IO(i)." NLRB v. Aerovox Corp., 389 F.2d 475, 477 (4th Cir. 1967). The
Aerovox court did not find a conflict between the standards used by the Tenth and Eighth
Circuits; only a focus on language to the exclusion of policies can stir up such conflict.
35. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
36. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 160(c) (1976).
37. The Board can issue a bargaining order for violations of§ 8(a)(5), which applies to
refusals to bargain with a duly certified union. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (l976);see note 4supra,
The Board may also order bargaining for violations of§§ S(a)(l) and 8(a)(3) and has done so
in Gissel bargaining orders. See note IO supra.
For a general discussion of§ 8(a)(5) and the duty to bargain in good faith, see GORMAN,
LABOR LAW 399-495 (1976).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1976). For a description of the procedures leading to an election,
see note 46 infra.
39. NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976), confers exclusive representational status on a
union "designated or selected" by a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining. But this provision does not specify the ways by which the
employees designate or select a union. In Gissel, the Supreme Court observed that
[a]lmost from the inception of the Act, then, it was recognized that a union did not have to
be certified as the winner of a Board election to invoke a bargaining obligation; it could
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In Gisse!,40 the Supreme Court upheld the Board's decision to order
bargaining with a union that had not been certified through the electoral process.41 The Supreme Court adopted the Board's position
that unfair labor practices committed by an employer can sometimes
prevent a union from winning a representational election42 and that
the proper remedy for such practices is to grant the union the status
of certified representative. 43 Although the Board could have remedied specific unfair labor practices,44 it could not repair the erosion
of the union's support caused by those practices. The Board determined, and the Supreme Court agreed, that this erosion could be
reversed only by placing the parties in the position that they would
have occupied had the union won a representation election.45 Thus,
the Gissel court concluded that the Board could order an employer
to bargain with an unelected union where a majority of the employestablish majority status by other means under the unfair labor practice provision of
§ 8(a)(5)-by showing convincing support, for instance, by a union-called strike or strike
vote, or, as here, by possession of cards signed by a majority of the employees authorizing
the union to represent them for collective bargaining purposes.
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596-97 (1969) (footnotes omitted). For the Court's
discussion of authorization cards, see note 75 i'!fra.
40. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
41. See note 10 supra.
42. 395 U.S. at 591.
43. 395 U.S. at 610-16.
44. For example, the Board could have remedied retaliatory discharges by ordering reinstatement with back pay. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). Retaliatory discharge is one of the most
common unfair labor practices in the Gissel situation. See cases cited in note 134 i'!fra.
45. The Supreme Court's acceptance of this determination lay at the heart of its decision to
permit the Board to order bargaining based on a card majority. If the harm had been reparable, an election or rerun election would be a sufficient remedy. In fact, the remedial purposes
of Gissel bargaining orders and § 100) are identical: both are designed to prevent irreparable
harm. Compare Kaynard v. Lawrence Rigging, Inc., 80 L.R.R.M (BNA) 2600, 2605 (E.D.N.Y.
1972) ("Gissel stands for the proposition that the Board is empowered to relieve by its final
order against the very dissipation of allegiance which lapse of time coupled with employer
intrusions may have created."), and text at note 29 supra, with notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text (Congress designed § 100) to prevent irreparable harm from developing in the interim between the commission of unfair labor practices and the issuance of the Board's final
order).
The Gissel Court has not been alone in concluding that employees' support for the union
can dissipate over time. In IUE v. NLRB (Tiidee Prods., Inc.-I) 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970), for example, the court observed that
Employee interest in a union can wane quickly as working conditions remain apparently unchanged by the union or collective bargaining. When the company is finally ordered to bargain with the union some years later, the union may find that it represents
only a small fraction of the employees . . . . Thus, the employer may reap a . . . benefit
from his original refusal to comply with the law: he may continue to enjoy lower labor
expenses after the order to bargain either because the union is gone or because it is too
weak to bargain effectively.
426 F.2d at 1249 (citations omitted).
In Gissel, the Supreme Court deferred to the Board's adjudicatory determination that unfair labor practices can undermine employee support for the union: "It is for the Board and
not the courts, however, to [determine], based on its expert estimate ...., the effects on the
election process of unfair labor practices of varying intensity." 395 U.S. at 612 n.32; cf. note 69
i'!fra (description of the deference due the Board when it acts in an adjudicatory capacity).
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ees had indicated their support for the union by signing authorization cards.46
Although the Board clearly has the authority to issue a bargaining order in a Gissel situation, the courts have disagreed over the
propriety of ordering section I O(j) relief during the interval between
the alleged unfair labor practices and the Board's final decision. 47
The courts disagree on this issue. for several reasons. First, some
courts have analyzed the potential harms to the union and have concluded that irreparable harm will not occur in the absence of a temporary bargaining order.48 Other courts have refused to order
46. The union typically urges employees to sign cards during its organizational drive, the
first step toward unionization. The cards authorize the union to represent the signer in bargaining with the employer over wages, hours, and working conditions. The union usually submits
the cards to the Board along with the union's petition for a representational election in order to
satisfy the Board's requirement that at least thirty percent of the employees favor an election.
See NLRB, Statements ofProcedure, NLRB RULES AND REGULATIONS AND STATEMENTS OF
PROCEDURES SERIES 8 § 101.18 (1979). The election requirement of thirty percent employee
support should not be confused with the card majority required for a Gissel bargaining order.
However, the Gissel court also acknowledged, in dicta, the possibility that the Board could
order bargaining even without a card majority in cases of egregious unfair labor practices. See
note 132 infra.
41. See note 12supra.
48. See, e.g., Boire ex rel. NLRB v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d II85, 1194 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976) ("We are not convinced that a continuation of the
non-bargaining status will so deleteriously affect the union that it cannot recover."); Fuchs ex
rel. NLRB v. Steel-Fab, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 385, 387 (D. Mass. 1973) (because the employees
did not have a collective bargaining agreement, they would not suffer irreparable harm from
the absence of one.).
In contrast, courts granting § 100) bargaining orders have concluded that such an order
was necessary to prevent irreparable harm to the union. In Seeler ex rel. NLRB v. Trading
Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1975), the Second Circuit said:
Just as a cease and desist order without more is ineffective as final relief in a Gissel situation, it is, in certain cases, also insufficient as interim relief. . . . Even if the Board finally
orders bargaining, probably close to two years after the union first demanded recognition,
the union's position in the plant may have already deteriorated to such a degree that
effective representation is no longer possible. Only if the district courts may issue interim
bargaining orders can the union's viability be maintained to the degree necessary to make
final Board adjudication in the form of an election or bargaining order meaningful.
517 F.2d at 37-38 (footnotes omitted). See also Wilson v. Liberty Homes, Inc., 108 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2688, 2696 (W.D. Wis. 1980) ("[I]n the time it takes for the Board to finally rule on
these charges and obtain enforcement of any consequent orders, support . . . for the union
may have eroded; erosion of support for the union in turn may unfairly diminish the union's
bargaining strength if and when [the employer] is compelled to bargain with it."), order 1•acated
and opinion withdrawn as moot, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2492 (7th Cir. 1982); Levine ex rel.
NLRB v. C & W Mining Co., 465 F. Supp. 690, 694 (N.D. Ohio) ("Union strength at the
Company has dissipated to a large extent in the past several months and is likely to be irrepa•
rably debilitated during the time necessary for Board hearings unless the Court acts now."),
mod!fted, 610 F.2d 432 (6th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Old Angus, Inc., 81 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2936,
2941 (D. Md. 1972) (Where extensive anti-union campaign by employer would have completely negated the union's organizational efforts, and where the union's inability to aid the
employees who embraced it would have undermined employee confidence in it, "(n]o final
order of the Board, no matter how wisely drafted, [could] restore the Union to the position it
held prior to the anti-union campaign . . . ."). The differing weight that the courts have at•
tached to the notion ofirreparable harm constitutes one of the reasons for the split over§ IOU)
Gissel bargaining orders.
The courts may have attached minimal weight to the possibility of irreparable harm be-
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bargaining because it would not restore any temporal status quo;
that is, it would not place the parties in a position that they had
previously occupied.49 Finally, some courts have suggested that a
court issuing a section lOG) bargaining order would encroach upon
the Board's statutory authority to remedy unfair labor practices. 50
cause Regional Directors often delay in seeking authority from the Board to petition for § IO(j)
relief. A Regional Director normally seeks authorization from the Board to petition for § IO(j)
relief at the same time he issues a complaint initiating administrative proceedings for alleged
unfair labor practices. See note 3 supra. The Regional Director should seek authorization to
petition for § IO(j) relief "[i]mmediately upon receipt of a request from a party for IO(j) relief,
or whenever the regional director believes that such relief is necessary." NLRB, CASEHANDLING MANUAL ~ 10310. l (1983). Despite this grant of discretion, the NLRB's procedures
clearly contemplate prompt action. Id The Regional Director usually seeks authorization at
the time a complaint alleging unfair labor practice is issued. Kaynard v. Lawrence Rigging,
Inc., 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2600, 2604 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). Indeed, the rationale for§ I0(j) relief
- prevention of irreparable harm - virtually compels the Regional Director, in the absence
of unusual circumstances, to seek § I0(j) relief as soon as possible.
Absent a change in the employer's behavior that spurs the Regional Director to petition for
§ lO(j) relief where he had not planned to do so, his delay should weigh against a temporary
bargaining order. Because irreparable harm to the union increases over time, see notes 67-69
infra and accompanying text, the marginal remedial effect of a § I 0(j) bargaining order as over
the Board's Gissel bargaining order varies inversely with the petitioner's delay in seeking relief.
The longer the delay, the less likely the § I0(j) order is to ensure the effectiveness of the
Board's order. Therefore, the petitioner's delay militates against § IO(j) relief.
The courts have taken the Regional Director's delay into account. Each of the courts denying § lO(j) relief indicated that the NLRB's delay in seeking a § IO(j) bargaining order undermined the Board's contention that the Union would be irreparably harmed in the absence of
such relief. Boire ex rel. NLRB v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 934 (1976); Fuchs ex rel. NLRB v. Steel-Fab, Inc. 356 F. Supp.
385, 388 (D. Mass. 1973); Kaynard v. Lawrence Rigging, Inc., 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2600, 2604
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) ("[T]he argument that a steady deterioration in the position of [the union]
results irreparably and irreversibly from continuation of the present condition of non- recognition . . . is an argument the force of which has dissipated with time . . . ."); see also Seeler ex
rel. NLRB v. H.G. Page & Sons, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 77, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (delay weighs
against § l0(j) bargaining order in non-Gissel situation). Thus, the Regional Director's delay
constitutes a strong factual explanation for the split over § IO(j) bargaining orders. q: NLRB
v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 430 (1967) (referring to alleged violation of§ 8(a)(5),
the court observed that "in the labor field, as in few others, time is crucially important in
obtaining relief."); see also Note, The Role of the Temporary Injunction in Reforming Labor
Law Administration, 8 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 553, 558 (1972).
49. See notes 92-104 i,ifra and accompanying text. As these notes indicate, other courts,
though adopting this temporal definition of the status quo, have nevertheless issued § IO(j)
bargaining orders in Gissel situations.
50. Some courts have indicated their reluctance to make preliminary decisions on any matters, other than the existence of unfair labor practices, that the Board must ultimately decide.
See, e.g., Boire ex rel. NLRB v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d ll85, ll92 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976) ("Proper composition of the bargaining unit, reinstatement of unlawfully discharged employees, and certification of the union as the bargaining
representative are matters generally left to the administrative expertise of the Board."); Boire
ex rel. NLRB v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 479 F.2d 778, 789 (5th Cir. 1973) ("It is
axiomatic that the Board should be accorded the opportunity to pass initially on questions
involving the construction of the N.L.R.A."); Kaynard v. Steel Fabricators Assn., 95 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2015, 2019-20 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) ("[A] due process problem lurks in the suggestion that a
court impotent to adjudicate the controlling substantive issues should, on a showing of
probability of outcome, alter legal relations pendente lite . . . .); Squillacote ex rel. NLRB v.
UAW Local 578, 384 F.Supp. 1171, ll74 (E.D. Wis. 1974) ("Section IO(j) was not intended to
change the basic procedure under the National Labor Relations Act which creates a system in

126

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 82:112

These courts have refused to do more than order the employer to
discontinue certain conduct if there is reasonable cause to believe
that the employer has committed unfair labor practices. 51
This Note contends that a section lOG) bargaining order is always just in the Gissel situation because the balance of harms favors
the union and the employees. The Board has conclusively determined that in the Gissel situation, the union will suffer severe and
irreparable harm in the interval between the unfair labor practices
and the Board's final adjudication.52 The district court should not
second guess the Board's determination by trying to predict whether
or not such harm will occur in a particular case. On the other hand,
the potential harms that the bargaining order causes are remediable.
A comparison of the risks of ordering and not ordering temporary
bargaining reveals that a section 1OG) bargaining order will preserve
the status quo by insuring that the Board's final order will be
effective.
The ·Note goes on to argue that the conditions under which a
section 1OG) bargaining order would be proper are delimited by
Congress' decision to delegate the authority to make labor policy to
the Board rather than the courts. 53 Only where the Board's past decisions have clearly established the relevant labor policy and indicate
a high probability that the Board will ultimately issue a Gissel bargaining order is section lOG) relief a proper way to protect the
Board's remedial authority.
A. Just Relief: Preserving the Effectiveness of the Board's
Remedial Order
1. Deterrence of Unfair Labor Practices

The Board's final Gissel order cannot fully remove the employer's incentive to engage in unfair labor practices calculated to
undermine a union's organizational drive.54 Because a substantial
amount of time passes between the unfair labor practices and the
which the Board, as an expert in the area, would in the first instance consider and decide the
issues . . . .").
51. See, e.g., Boire ex rel NLRB v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185 (2d Cir.
1975) (order prohibiting commission of any unfair labor practices in fuluro); Boire ex rel
NLRB v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 479 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1973) (issuing injunction).
52. See notes 59-69 infra and accompanying text, note 134 infra.
53. See note 50 supra; note 69 infra.
54. The Gissel order itself is designed to deter unfair labor practices:
If the Board could enter only a cease-and-desist order and direct an election or a rerun, it
would in effect be rewarding the employer and allowing him 'to profit from [his] own
wrongful refusal to bargain,' while at the same time severely curtailing the employees'
right freely to determine whether they desire a representative.
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575,610 (1969) (quoting Frank Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321
U.S. 702, 704 (1944)).
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Board's final order,55 practices that successfully prevent the union's
effective organization will allow the employer to gain from the resulting delay in bargaining. An employer can substantially reduce
its labor costs during this period, depending on the size of the bargaining unit, the potential increase in employee benefits that union
representation would produce, and the probability that the union,
absent the employer's unfair labor practices, could have obtained
these increased benefits.56 The employer might also gain if its unfair
labor practices reduced the chances of unionization in the long
term. 57 Only by denying the employer these potential economic benefits can a court remove th~ incentive to engage in Gissel-type unfair
labor practices and thus preserve the Board's ability to deter such
practices with its final order. Indeed, section lOG) relief may have an
even stronger deterrent effect than the Board's final order because it
would require the employer to bargain at an earlier date. 58
2. Redress of Unfair Labor Practices

a. Irreparable Harm to the Employees
Unfair labor practices that prevent a fair election irreparably
harm employees. The employees lose the benefits of representation
and of a potential collective bargaining agreement during the interval between the unfair labor practices and the Board's final order. 59
55. See note 6 supra.
56. The employer will eventually lose to the extent that the Board's remedial measures
impose costs - for example, back pay awards for retaliatory discharge. See note 44supra. But
if the employer believes that the increased labor costs avoided by delaying bargaining pending
the Board's decision will outweigh the costs later imposed by the Board's order, it will have an
incentive to continue to engage in unfair labor practices.
51. See IUE v. NLRB (fiidee Prods., Inc.,-!), 426 F.2d 1243, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("Thus
the employer may reap a . . . benefit from his original refusal to comply with the law: he may
continue to enjoy lower labor expenses after the order to bargain either because the union is
gone or because it is too weak to bargain effectively."), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970); see
also notes 67-70 infra and accompanying text.
58. q. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 18 HARV. L. REV. 38, 133 (1964) ("Since an order to bargain with
the union will destroy any value to be derived from violating the law, it provides a highly
effective deterrent."); McCulloch, An Evaluation of the Remedies Available to the NLRB- Is
There Needfor Legislative or Administrative Change?, 15 LAB. L.J. 755, 760 (1964) ("It is not
unco=on in these as in other cases for the Board's institution of extraordinary action [a
petition for a§ IOG) injunction] to precipitate settlements or agreements to end alleged unlawful conduct pending final decision.").
59. The unfair labor practices in Gissel situations often included firings alleged to violate
§ 8(a)(3). See, e.g., Kaynard ex rel NLRB v. Palby Lingerie, Inc., 625 F.2d 1047, 1051 (2d
Cir. 1980); Levine ex rel NLRB v. C & W Mining Co., 610 F.2d 432, 435 (6th Cir. 1979);
Seeler ex rel NLRB v. Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1975); Boire ex rel NLRB
v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1191 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934
(1976); Wilson ex rel NLRB v. Liberty Homes, Inc., 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2688, 2691 (W.D.
Wis. 1980), order vacated as moot and opinion withdrawn as moot, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2492
(7th Cir. 1982); Gottfried ex rel NLRB v. Mayco Plastics, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 1161, 1163 (E.D.
Mich. 1979), a.ffd. mem. 615 F.2d 1360 (6th Cir. 1980); Hirsch ex rel NLRB v. Trim Lean Meat
Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 1351, 1358-59 (D. Del. 1979); Smith ex rel NLRB v. Old Angus,
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The Board has, however, refused to compensate employees for these
lost benefits in its Gissel orders, 60 arguing that such awards would be
speculative,61 would discourage an employer's good faith appeals of
legitimate legal issues, 62 and would as a practical matter illegally
force the employer to accept particular terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 63 Nevertheless, the Board has lamented its inability
Inc., 81 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2936, 2941 (D. Md. 1972); Kaynard v. Lawrence Rigging, Inc., 80
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2600, 2605-06 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). Consequently, a § 100) court often must
decide whether to order reinstatement as well as bargaining. The harm that loss of jobs imposes on employees certainly weighs in the§ lO(j) criteria for reinstatement. See note 28 supra
(§ lO(j) protects parties affected by collective bargaining). However, § l0(j) reinstatement orders are beyond the scope of this Note; therefore, the Note does not explicitly weigh an employee's interest in reinstatement in the criteria for a § lO(j) bargaining order. Nevertheless,
unlawful firings are probative of the severity of the employer's unfair labor practices and thus
of the probablility that the Board will ultimately issue a Gissel bargaining order. See notes
130-36 infra and accompanying text.
60. The Board has emphatically stated that it remains "convinced . . . that (it] lacks statutory authority to grant such relief," and that it "will therefore adhere to [its] position in this
matter unless and until the Supreme Court decides otherwise." Heck's, Inc. 191 N.L.R.B. 886,
888 (1971); accord Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 108-10 (1970), mod(jied on other
groundspercuriam sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971), order of remand
vacated on other grounds, 449 F.2d 1058, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The Board's refusal to allow
relief persists despite judicial prodding to grant retroactive compensation. See, e.g., IUE V.
NLRB (Tiidee Prods., Inc.-1), 426 F.2d 1243, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950
(1970).
The only retrospective relief that the Board has included in its bargaining orders has been
to make the employer's obligation to bargain effective "as of the time the employer •.• embarked on a clear course of unlawful conduct or . . . engaged in sufficient unfair labor practices to undermine the union's majority status." Trading Port, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 298, 301
(1975). Thus, if the employer commits unfair labor practices during the union's organizational
drive, a Gissel bargaining order will be retroactive to the time at which the union obtained a
card majority and demanded recognition. If the employer commits unfair labor practices after
the union's demand for recognition, a Gissel bargaining order will be retroactive to the time at
which the employer first committed unfair labor practices. See, e.g., Doug Hartley, Inc., 255
N.L.R.B. 800, 801 (1981); Justak Bros. and Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 1054, 1087 (1981); The Kroger
Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 149, 151 (1977); Corl Corp., 222 N.L.R.B. 243, 258-59 (1976). The retroactive obligation to bargain prevents the employer from making unilateral changes in the
mandatory subjects of bargaining - wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) & 159(a) (1976); Trading Port, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. at 302. It
does not, however, require the employer to compensate employees for any economic benefits
they would have gained from a collective bargaining agreement.
61. The benefits of a collective bargaining agreement are inherently speculative, because
the terms of the agreement that the parties would have reached in the absence of unfair labor
practices cannot be determined in advance ofan actual agreement. See Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185
N.L.R.B. 107, 110 (1970), mod(fied on other grounds per curiam sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 449
F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971),orderofremandvacatedonother grounds, 449 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
62. The employer would be discouraged from appealing by the threat of large monetary
damages accruing during the course of its appeal. See Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 109
(1970), mod(fied on other grounds per curiam sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), order of remand vacated on other grounds, 449 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
63. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976), states that the obligation to bargain collectively "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107,
110 (1970),mod(/ied on other groundspercuriamsubnom. UAW v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), order of remand vacated on other grounds, 449 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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to protect the employees' interim interests64 and has also concluded
that the resulting threat of irreparable harm in this situation justifies
preventive section IO(j) relief. 65
b. Irreparable Harm to the Union
The Board issues Gissel orders to remedy the erosion of union
support caused by unfair labor practices.66 Although the Board's
final order can remedy this erosion to some extent, the Board has
determined that its order may be unable to restore the union to the
level of strength it held before the employer's unfair labor practices.
Certain unfair labor practices reduce employees' support for the
union, 67 thus irreparably undermining the union's strength over
time. 68 Tlie longer the period before adjudication, the less effective
the Board's Gissel order will be. For example, by the time of the
Board's order, the union may not have majority support, and may
64. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 108 (1970) ("current remedies of the Board
designed to cure violations of [§) 8(a)(5) are inadequate"), mod!fied on other grounds per
curiam sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971), order ofremand vacated on
other grounds, 449 F.2d 1058, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see also note 68 infra.
65. See Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 110 (1970), mod!fied on other grounds per
curiam sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971), order ofremand vacated on
other grounds, 449 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see also note 68 infra. The§ lO(j) bargaining
order can remedy the interim harm to the employees where the Board's order cannot, because
the § I0G) order would be prospective. Thus, the problems of speculative damages and imposition of contractual terms on the parties, see notes 61 & 63 supra, would not exist, because the
parties would bargain for their own agreement. The problem of deterring legitimate appeals,
see note 62 supra, would not exist where the order was prospective, because the employees'
receipt of an agreement's benefits could be conditioned on the Board's final affirmance of the
duty to bargain. See notes 85-86 infra and accompanying text.
66. See note 45 supra.
67. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
68. In Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970), mod!fied on other grounds per curiam sub
nom. UAW v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971), order of remand vacated on other
grounds, 449 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the Board acknowledged that the "current remedies
of the Board designed to cure violations of[§] 8(a)(5) are inadequate." 185 N.L.R.B. at 108.
In so acknowledging, the Board determined, in its capacity as an adjudicatory agency delegated the power to make national labor policy, that the effects of unfair labor practices over
time irreparably erode employee support for the union and thus diminish the union's bargaining strength:
A mere affirmative order that an employer bargain upon request does not eradicate the
effects ofan unlawful delay of2 or more years in the fulfillment ofa statutory bargaining
obligation. It does not put the employees in the position of bargaining strength they
would have enjoyed if their employer had immediately recognized and bargained with
their chosen representative. It does not dissolve the inevitable employee frustration or
protect the Union from the loss of employee support attributable to such delay.
185 N.L.R.B. at 108. To prevent this irreparable harm, the Board called for "full resort to the
injunctive relief provision[] of[§] IOG)." 185 N.L.R.B. at I lO;seealso IUE v. NLRB, 502 F.2d
349,362 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (In advocating the make-whole remedy for unlawful refusals to bargain, the court stated that "[t]he policy of the NLRA requiring good faith bargaining between
management and labor is too important to be vindicated only through in futuro relief.");
United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 496 F.2d 1342, 1351-52 (5th Cir. 1974); Wellman
Indus., 248 N.L.R.B. 325, 326 n.8 (1980) ("[a] mere affirmative order [to bargain] does not
eradicate the effects of an unlawful delay") (citing JUE v. NLRB). Although the Board did not
discuss this harm in the context ofa § IO(j) proceeding, the harm is one that occurs because of
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therefore be unable to use the threat of a strike as a bargaining chip.
Thus, the Board has indicated as a matter ofpolicy that it cannot
effectively remedy the harm that the union will suffer during the interim period.69 Because the injurious effects of eroding support inthe delays inherent in the process of administrative adjudication. The harm is, therefore, one
that Congress designed § I0(j) to prevent. See notes 22-28 supra and accompanying text.
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Gissel recognized that the effects of unfair labor practices
can continue into the future:
If the Board finds that the possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional remedies, though present, is
slight and that employee sentiment once expressed through cards would, on balance, be
better protected by a bargaining order, then such an order should issue.
395 U.S. at 614-15. The Supreme Court has also recognized that an employer's refusal to
bargain can eventually cause irreparable harm by deflating the morale of the employees, disrupting organizational drives, and discouraging membership in unions. Franks Bros. v,
NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 704 (1944).
In cases where the employer has discharged employees to destroy the union's majority
support, the possibility of an eventual reinstatement order should not diminish the need for
§ IO(j) relief to prevent the harm of erosion. The discharged employees may well move or
obtain other employment before the Board's order. Empirical studies have demonstrated that
unless reinstatement takes place within a short time after discharge, the wrongfully discharged
employee will probably never again be permanently employed by the employer that discharged him. See, e.g., Stephens & Chaney, A Study of the Reinslatemenl Remedy U11der the
National Labor Relations Act, 25 LAB. L. J. 31, 40 (1974);Amendmenls lo Expedite the Remedies ofthe National Labor Relations Act: Hearings on R.R. 7125 Before the Special Subcomm.
on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 265, 265-73 (1973); McCulloch, Past, Present and
Future Remedies Under Section 8(a){5) ofthe NLRA, 19 LAB. L. J. 131, 137 (1968) ("When an
employer violates [§] 8(a)(5) by refusing to engage in initial bargaining, the harmful consequences of delay may be especially harsh . . . because, with the passage of time, their chosen
representative's effectiveness tends to be diluted by turnover, employee frustration and other
changing circumstances."). For these reasons, the courts have also recognized the inadequacy
of the Board's reinstatement order. See, e.g., Wilson v. Liberty Homes, Inc., 108 L.R.R.M.
2688, 2693-94 (W.D. Wis. 1980) ("[T]he delay inherent in the Board's processes will cause [the]
order to be ineffective. There is a significant possibility that, by that time, the [employees] who
will be entitled to reinstatement . . . will have accepted employment with other employers,
perhaps in other locations, and will be understandably reluctant to . . . return to their former
jobs."), order vacated as moot and opinion withdrawn as moo/, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2492 (7th
Cir. 1982).
69. Whether or not the Board's determination that unfair labor practices irreparably diminish the union's strength and render ineffective the Board's order holds true in every case
need not concern the court considering a § I0(j) petition. The court should defer to the
Board's determination for two reasons. First, the Board possesses expertise in industrial relations that the courts lack. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975) (The Board
"has the 'special function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of
industrial life,' and its special competence in this field is the justification for the deference
accorded its determination.") (citations omitted); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575,
612 n.32 (1969) ("In fashioning its remedies under the broad provisions of§ IO(c) of the Act
(20 U.S.C. § 160(c)), the Board draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise all its own, and its
choice of remedy must therefore be given special respect by reviewing courts.").
Second, the Board's determination is a policy decision: it has concluded that it will better
be able to accomplish the goals of the NLRA by assuming the existence of harm than by
making a case by case inquiry. The courts should defer to this policy decision because Congress has delegated the power to formulate labor policy to the Board, not the courts. See
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963) ("The ultimate problem is the balancing of the conflicting legitimate interests. The function of striking that balance to effectuate
national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review.");
accord NLRB v. Food Store Employees Union Local 347,417 U.S. 1, 10 (1974) (The Supreme
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crease with time, immediacy of relief is essential. _Only a section
IOG) bargaining order can provide such relief. Therefore, absent
countervailing irreparable harm from the order itself, the courts
should use section IO(j) relief to prevent irreparable injury to the
union. 70
3. Potential Harms Created by the Section JO(j) Gissel Bargaining
Order
A temporary bargaining order will impose costs on parties other
than the union.71 Of course, if these costs are inherent in a Gissel
order of any type, whether issued by a court or the· Board, they
should not weigh in the balance against the section lO(j) bargaining
order. But section IO(j) relief would not be just if the harm caused
by the temporary bargaining order, discounted by the chance that
the Board will not order bargaining, outweighs the harm to the
union in the absence of such an order.72
Court has required adherence to "the congressional scheme investing the Board and not the
courts with broad powers to fashion remedies that will effectuate national labor policy.");
Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 176 (1973) (the Board has the "broad discretion to fashion and issue . . . relief adequate to achieve the ends, and effectuate the policies
of the [NLRA]");see also Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941). Thus, the
court should not substitute its own judgment on the effect of unfair labor practices for the
Board's. In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951), for example, the
court stated that judicial review of decisions made by the Board acting in its capacity as an
adjudicatory agency is not "intended to negative the function of the Labor Board as one of
those agencies presumably equipped or informed by experience to deal with a specialized field
of knowledge, whose findings within that field carry the authority of an expertness which
courts do not possess and therefore must respect." Moreover, "even as to matters not requiring
expertise," a court may not "displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views,
even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been
before it de novo." Accord Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commn., 383 U.S. 607, 621 (1966)
("[l]t is usually better to minimize the opportunity for reviewing courts to substitute their discretion for that of the agency.").
Whether employer unfair labor practices actually reduce employee support for the union is
an open question. Their effect on the union's bargaining strength is unknown and their impact
on the union's chances of winning a representational election is disputed. Compare J.
GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY 128-29 (1976) (''The unions did not lose significantly more support in unlawful elections
than in clean elections"), with NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. 395 U.S. 575, 611 n.30-31 (1969)
(employer can "affect the outcome of a rerun election by delaying tactics"); General Knit of
California, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619, 621-22 (1978); Eames, An Analysis of the Union Voting
Studyfrom a Trade Unionist's Point of View, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1181 (1976) (''the data [of the
Getman, Goldberg, and Herman study] do not support the authors' conclusions that campaign
propaganda and campaign coercion do not affect the outcome of the campaign."); Note, Misrepresentation in NLRB-Conducted Elections, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 119, 128-31 (1979).
70. This balancing of potential harms comports with the traditional equitable criteria for a
temporary injunction. See note 72 infra.
71. These costs consist of (1) the loss to employees forced to accept unwanted representation, see text at notes 73-78 infra; (2) the loss to the employer from denial of the chance for a
representation election, see notes 79-82 infra and accompanying text; and (3) the loss to the
employer from the cost of any agreement reached, see notes 83-86 infra and accompanying
text.

72. Protection of the process of collective bargaining and promotion of the free flow of

132

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 82:112

a. Potential Harm to the Employees
The purpose of a Gissel bargaining order is to give effect to the
employees' preference for union representation.73 But in Gissel situations, the employees express their preference through authorization
cards, a process admittedly inferior to a representational election. 74
Therefore, both section IO(j) relief and the Board's Gissel bargaining
order run the risk of imposing union representation even though a
majority of the employees did not really support the union at the
close of the organizational drive.
In Gissel, the Supreme Court concluded that this risk is not serious, holding that authorization cards, which the union must solicit
under the NLRB's rules, can adequately reflect the employees' desire
for union representation.75 The Court also concluded that the actual
harm caused by unwanted unions would "be minimal at best, . . .
co=erce require the § IO(j) court to balance the harms to the employer, the employees, the
union, and the public. See notes 25-28 supra and accompanying text.
This balancing of potential harms is also present in the traditional equitable criteria for a
temporary injunction. A court deciding the propriety of temporary injunctive relief will examine: (I) the threat of irreparable harm to the petitioner absent relief; (2) the potential for the
creation of counterbalancing irreparable harm to respondent; (3) harm to third parties; and (4)
the petitioner's probability of success on the merits. See, e.g., Washington v. Walker, 529 F.2d
1062, 1065 (7th Cir. 1976); Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Costanzo, 528 F.2d 250,
252 (4th Cir. 1975); Gulf & Western Indus. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687,
692 (2d Cir. 1973); Asher v. Laird, 475 F.2d 360, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Allison v. Froehlke, 470
F.2d 1123, 1126 (5th Cir. 1972).
The Supreme Court has outlined the role of equitable components in the criteria for a
statutory injunction in Hect Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944). The Heel court called upon
district courts to act "in accordance with their traditional [equitable] practices, as conditioned
by the necessities of the public interest which Congress has sought to protect," 321 U.S. at 330.
The Court used the term "public interest" to mean the policies that Congress intended the
statutory injunction to promote. 321 U.S. at 331. Thus, the fact that an injunction is authorized by statute requires the affected court to exercise its equitable discretion "in light of the
large objectives of the [statute authorizing the injunction]." 321 U.S. at 331. Two courts have
implicitly relied on Heel in formulating their § IO(j) criteria. See Seeler ex rel. NLRB v.
Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33, 39-40 (2d Cir. 1975); Gottfried ex rel. NLRB v. Mayco Plastics, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 1161, 1165 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (recognizing that "public interest" stands
for the policies that Congress designed the NLRA to promote), qffd. mem., 615 F.2d 1360 (6th
Cir. 1980).
A court, then, may consider both equitable considerations and the policies that Congress
designed § IO(j) to further in determining the propriety of a temporary bargaining order. The
equitable considerations fill in the gaps that the legislative history and the NLRA's declarations of Congressional purpose have left in the meaning of§ IO(j). See Westen & Lehman, Is
There Life For Erie After Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 330-36 (1980).
73. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969).
14. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 602.
75. The Gissel court reached this conclusion after an extensive discussion of the reliability
of authorization cards:
The acknowledged superiority of the election process, however, does not mean that cards
are thereby rendered totally invalid, for where an employer engages in conduct disruptive
of the election process, cards may be the most effective-perhaps the only-way of assuring employee choice. As for misrepresentation, in any specific case of alleged irregularity
in the solicitation of the cards, the proper course is to apply the Board's customary standards . . . and rule that there was no majority if the standards were not satisfied. It does
not follow that because there are some instances of irregularity, the cards can never be
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for there 'is every reason for the union to negotiate a contract that
will satisfy the majority, for the union will surely realize that it must
win the support of the employees, in the face of a hostile employer,
in order to survive the threat of a decertification election after a year
has passed.' " 76 Finally, the Court noted in Gissel, as a factor lessening the potential harm to employees, that the bargaining order is a
used; otherwise, an employer could put off his bargaining obligation indefinitely through
continuing interference with elections.
The . . . complaint that the cards are too often obtained through misrepresentation and
coercion must be rejected also in view of the Board's present rules for controlling card
solicitation, which we view as adequate to the task where the cards involved state their
purpose clearly and unambiguously on their face.
395 U.S. at 602-04.
The Supreme Court also indicated that
[u]nder the [doctrine of Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963), affd., 351
F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1965)], if the card itself is unambiguous (ie., states on its face that the
signer authorizes the Union to represent the employee for collective bargaining purposes
and not to seek an election), it will be counted unless it is proved that the employee was
told that the card was to be used solely for the purpose of obtaining an election.
395 U.S. at 584 (emphasis in original). The Court expressly upheld the Board's Cumberland
Shoe rule. 395 U.S. at 606. Under Cumberland Shoe and its progeny, the facially misleading
nature of the authorization card or the effects of a union's coercion in obtaining signatures
during the organizational drive would lead the Board to decide whether to count certain cards.
See, e.g., NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1967); Levi Strauss & Co.,
172 N.L.R.B. 732 (1968); Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963), affd., 351 F.2d
917 (6th Cir. 1965). Even where the Board finds that the union engaged in a pattern of misrepresentation or coercion, it will not invalidate all of the cards; rather, it invalidates only those
cards that the company proves were signed because of threats or misunderstanding of purpose.
Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709, 710 (1961), enforced 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962).
The empirical evidence supports the Court's conclusion that signed cards accurately reflect
the sentiments of the employees who sign. See J. GETMAN, s. GOLDBERG, & J. HERMAN,
UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY 132-33 (1976).
76. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 612-13 n.33 (quoting Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in
Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 135
(1964)).
A court ordering § 100) relief is, however, more likely to inflict this harm. The Gissel
Court expressed its confidence in the Board's ability to determine the validity of cards in adjudicatory proceedings. See note 75 supra. But the court considering a § 100) petition must
decide based on an assessment of validity made by the prosecutor/al, rather than the adjudicatory, branch of the NLRB. See notes 5 & 11 supra.
Nevertheless, the potential for this harm should not be significant. The prosecutorial
branch is also expert in making this determination. See note 132 infra. Moreover, the court
considering the § 100) petition will probably have the record of the proceedings before the
administrative law judge. See note 136 infra. This record would contain the evidence on
which the Board would ultimately determine the validity of the cards. Therefore, the court
would make its decision on information just as reliable as that upon which the Board's decision is based.
If the court refused to order bargaining by concluding that the Board, no_t the court, must
ultimately determine the validity of the cards, it would erect a per se rule against bargaining
orders. See notes 50 supra and 128 infra. The authorization card issue should not give rise to
a per se rule against bargaining, because such a rule would undermine the deterrent effect of
§ 100) bargaining orders. See note 58 supra. A per se rule would allow an employer to remove its unfair labor practices from the ambit of§ 100) relief simply by questioning the validity of authorization cards. This immunity would give the employer an incentive to commit
unfair labor practices rather than to seek a representational election. The employer could then
gain an increment of time in which the probability of its reaching a collective bargaining
agreement was zero.
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temporary measure.77 Section IO(j) relief is even less enduring because it dissolves when the Board renders its decision. 7 B Thus, section 1O(j) relief would not irreparably injure employee interests and
therefore would not destroy the effectiveness of the Board's final
order.
b.

Potential Harms to the Employer

A section IO(j) bargaining order can harm the employer in two
ways. First, the order may replace a campaign and election.79 The
order would then prevent the employer from presenting to the employees its case against unionization and from ascertaining through
an election whether a majority of the employees really does support
the union. Second, the employer and the union may enter into a
collective bargaining agreement pursuant to the section 1O(j) bargaining order, only to have the Board later rule that Gissel does not
obligate the employer to bargain.
The employer's potential loss of access to the electoral process
should not weigh against the issuance of a temporary bargaining order. Ordinarily, an employer may lawfully refuse to bargain when
confronted with a recognition demand from a union possessing a
card majority and may insist that the union petition for a representational election.Bo Under Gissel, the employer forfeits access to the
electoral process only if it instead responds by launching a salvo of
severe unfair labor practices.B 1 This Note contends that courts can
properly order section IO(j) relief only if the case gives rise to a high
77. "There is, after all, nothing permanent in a bargaining order, and if, after the effects of
the employer's acts have worn off, the employees clearly desire to disavow the union, they can
do so by filing a representation petition." Gissel, 395 U.S. at 613.
78. See note 83 i'!fi-a. For other ways by which the courts can minimize the duration of a
§ !O(j) injunction, see note 84 i'!fi-a.
79. The unfair labor practices may lead the union to withdraw its petition for an election.
The Board's Gissel bargaining order eliminates the election. If the union brings its case after
losing an election, the Board's Gissel bargaining order eliminates the rerun election. See notes
41-46 supra and accompanying text.
80. "(A]n employer is not obligated to accept a card check as proof of majority status,
under the Board's current practice, and he is not required to justify his insistence on an election by making his own investigation of employee sentiment and showing affirmative reasons
for doubting the majority status." Gissel, 395 U.S. at 609. Moreover, "unless an employer has
engaged in an unfair labor practice that impairs the electoral process, a union with authorization cards purporting to represent a majority of the employees, which is refused recognition,
has the burden of taking the next step in invoking the Board's election procedure." Linden
Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301,310 (1974).
81. "An employer, as the Supreme Court has held, has a right to an election so long as he
does not fatally impede the election process. Once he has so impeded the process, he has
forfeited his right to a Board election and must bargain with the union on the basis of other
clear indications of employees' desires." Trading Port, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 298, 301 (1975) (footnote omitted). To prove that the employer co=itted unfair labor practices, the union must
demonstrate that the employer was aware of the union's organizational drive, NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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probability that the Board will ultimately issue a Gissel bargaining
order. 82 Thus, a court ordering section lOG) relief will not inflict a
unique harm on the employer, because, under the standard proposed
in this Note, the Board's order will probably result in a forfeiture
anyway.
The second and more troublesome harm arises from the possibility that the employer and the union may enter into a collective bargaining agreement only to have the Board later decide that the
employer has no duty to bargain. In the interim, the employer may
have increased compensation or benefits because of bargaining into
which it should not have been forced.
Nevertheless, this potential problem should not tip the section
lOG) balance against temporary bargaining orders for three reasons.
First, the possibility of the harm materializing should be minimal if
a court grants section IOG) relief only if there is a high probability
that the Board will ultimately issue a Gissel order. Second, the interval in which harm could occur should be minimal. The employer
should be able to demand, without violating its duty to bargain in
good faith, that the interim bargaining agreement terminate if the
Board ends the bargaining relationship by overruling a previously
issued section lOG) bargaining order. 83 Any harm would thus be
confined to the interval between the conclusion of the agreement and
the issuance of the Board's final order. Moreover, the duration of
this interval will be minimized since the Board expedites cases for
which it has obtained section 1OG) relief. 84
82. See notes 130-36 infra and accompanying text. The Board's screening process has led
it to seek § 100) bargaining orders only in situations in which a Gissel bargaining order would
be justified. See note 20 supra and accompanying text; note 134 i,!fra.
83. See note 8S i,!fra.
The Board's order automatically terminates the § 100) injunction. The Supreme Court
held in a case arising under § 10(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1976), that Congress
designed § 10(1) to provide relief only until the Board's disposition of the alleged unfair labor
practices. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpet Layers Union, 397 U.S. 65S, 6S9 (1970).
The Sears Court based its decision on the legislative history of § 10(1): "The legislative
history makes clear that the purpose of enacting § 10(1) in 1947 was simply to supplement the
pre-existing§ lO(e) power of the Board by authorizing injunctive relief prior to Board action."
397 U.S. at 6S8. This rationale applies to § 100) as well because the portion of the legislative
history quoted by the court refers expressly to both §§ 100) and 10(1). 397 U.S. at 6S8-S9 n.S
(quoting S. REP. No. 10S, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1947)).
Since Sears, the only two courts to face the issue have held that a§ 100) injunction lapses
upon the Board's order. Barbour v. Central Cartage, Inc., S83 F.2d 33S (7th Cir. 1978); Johansen v. Queen Mary Restaurant Corp., S22 F.2d 6 (9th Cir. 197S).
84. Such cases receive priority throughout the administrative proceedings over all other
cases except those under§§ 10(1) and lO(m) of the NLRA. 29 C.F.R. § 102.94 (1983). Moreover, the injunction may terminate prior to the Board's decision if, for example, the administrative law judge dismisses the case.
The court may also limit the duration of the § 100) injunction, thereby reducing the
amount of time in which the union can secure a collective bargaining agreement prior to the
Board's decision. The Third Circuit, for example, has imposed a series of time limits on all
§ 100) injunctions, corresponding to the various stages of the administrative proceedings. See
Eisenberg ex rel. NLRB v. Hartz Mountain Corp., S19 F.2d 138, 144 (3rd Cir. 197S). The
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Third, any harm arising in this interval will be reparable. The
harm that the employer would suffer during this interim period
would consist of the economic concessions obtained by the union in
the collective bargaining agreement. This harm need not be irreparable, because the employer should be able to demand, without violating its duty to bargain in good faith, terms that would relieve the
employer from its obligation to honor these concessions where the
Board later decides that the employer is not obligated to bargain. 85
The increased benefits from an interim agreement could be conditionally paid. For example, the employer could pay any marginal
increase in wages into an escrow account pending the Board's final
disposition of the Gissel question. 86 Thus, the employer may guard
itself against irreparable interim harm arising from particular
concessions.
An additional risk arises if the parties disagree over the appropriate bargaining unit. 87 The NLRB would ordinarily determine the
Second Circuit modified a§ lO(i) injunction, requiring its automatic termination if the administrative law judge did not render a decision within two months or the Board within four
months. Kaynard ex rel. NLRB v. Mego Corp., 633 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1980).
85. In Kaynard ex rel. NLRB v. Palby Lingerie, Inc., 625 F.2d 1047, 1054 (2d Cir. 1980),
the NLRB had not determined the appropriate bargaining unit with finality at the time of the
lO(i) proceeding. Thus, the employer faced the risk of entering into an agreement with a union
that might not represent all of the employees subject to the agreement. The court noted that
the employer could protect itself from this risk in the collective bargaining agreement: "[A]ny
agreement can contain a condition subsequent to take into account the possibility of the
Board's rejecting the Regional Director's unit determination . . . ." 625 F.2d at 1054. Similarly, in Ferguson-Steere Motor Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 1076, 1079 (1955), the Board held that the
employer's "insistence that the continued effectiveness of any new agreement be conditioned
upon the result ofits declaratory judgment action" in federal court did not violate § 8(a)(5) of
the NLRA (refusal to bargain collectively with representatives of the employees).
86. The money in this account would go back to the employer if the Board did not order
bargaining. If the collective bargaining agreement requires the employer to make contributions for fringe benefits, the employer should be able to demand that the employees tempora•
rily make these contributions. The employer would have to establish an escrow account into
which it would pay for fringe benefits as required by the agreement. If the Board ordered
bargaining, the employer would reimburse the employees from the escrow account.
Moreover, the decision of the court considering the § lO(i) petition should not tum on
speculation as to whether the employer will be able to obtain the time limit, see text at note 83
supra, and escrow accounts. Cf. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300,317 (1965)
(The Board does not have "a general authority to assess the relative economic power of the
adversaries in the bargaining process and to deny weapons to one party or the other because of
its assessment of that party's bargaining power."); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Intl. Union, 361
U.S. 477,497 (1960) (The Board does not have the authority to act "as an arbiter of the sort of
economic weapons the parties can use in seeking to gain acceptance of their bargaining demands." ). Because the Board lacks the authority to balance the bargaining strengths of the
parties, a federal district court should not grant or deny § I0(i) relief based on speculation as to
the employer's ability to extract certain terms. Cf. note 69 supra (Board has expertise and
delegated authority that courts lack).
87. The courts are split over the propriety of§ lO(i) bargaining orders when the NLRB has
not yet determined the appropriate bargaining unit with finality. Compare Kaynard ex rel
NLRB v. Palby Lingerie, Inc., 625 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1980) and Levine ex rel NLRB v. C &
W Mining Co., 610 F.2d 432 (6th Cir. 1979) (§ lO(i) bargaining order granted), with Taylor ex
rel NLRB v. Circo Resorts, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 152 (D. Nev. 1978) (§ lO(i) bargaining order
denied).
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bargaining unit before a representational election. 88 But the NLRB
may not be able to make such a decision before the section lO(j)
proceeding takes place. In such cases, a temporary bargaining order
might obligate the employer to bargain with a union that does not
lawfully represent all of the employees, since the final bargaining
unit might differ from the one that the section lO(j) order encompasses. In situations of this sort the district court should stay section
lO(j) proceedings until the NLRB has determined the appropriate
bargaining unit. The resulting delay would be relatively short. 89
Ultimately, a section lO(j) bargaining order might be appropriate
88. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 101.17 (1983).
89. The justification for a stay lies in the procedures by which the NLRB determines bargaining units. The NLRA vests the Board with the authority to determine the unit that the
union represents as a bargaining agent. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976). The Board "is authorized to
delegate to its regional directors its powers under [§] 159 of this title to determine the unit
appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining . . . ,'' 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1973), and has,
in fact, done so. NLRB, NLRB RULES AND REGULATIONS AND STATEMENTS OF PROCEDURE,
SERIES 8 § 102.67(a) (1979) [hereinafer cited as RULES AND REGULATIONS].
The Regional Director's decision is subject to the Board's review, RULES AND REGULATIONS, supra, at § 102.67(b), although the Board is not required to review the decision. RULES
AND REGULATIONS,supra, at§ 102.67(c). The bargaining unit will be unsettled at the time of
the § 100) hearing only if the Board has decided to review the Regional Director's decision.
The Regional Director should be able to render his decision on the appropriate bargaining
unit prior to the § IO{j) proceeding. The median time required to process representation cases,
the category that includes disputes over the appropriate bargaining unit, see NLRB, FORTYFOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 261 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT], is far less than the median time required to issue a complaint
for unfair labor practices. For example, in 1979 it took the office of the Regional Director a
median time of 39 days to make its decision in representational cases; in contrast, it took the
Regional Director a median time of 45 days to issue a complaint for unfair labor practices
after a party had filed a charge. ANNUAL REPORT, supra, at 12, 17. Thus, the Regional Office
should be able to rule on the bargaining unit shortly after the Regional Director petitions for
§ IO{j) relief, even if the Director has simultaneously issued a complaint for unfair labor practices. The Regional Director will have even more time to determine the appropriate bargaining unit if the court considering the § IO(j) petition stays the proceedings until the hearing
before the administrative law judge is complete. See generally note 136 iefra. In 1977, the
median time between the issuance of a complaint and the close of the administrative hearing
was 90 days. Nolan and Lehr, supra note 5, at 51.
If the Board does choose to review the Regional Director's decision, it will do so only
because the Regional Director's decision is outside the parameters of established labor policy.
The Board will grant a request for review only where compelling reasons exist therefor.
Accordingly, a request for review may be granted only upon one or more of the following
grounds:
(I) That a substantial question of law of policy is raised because of (i) the absence of, or
(ii) a departure from, officially reported Board precedent.
(2) That the regional director's decision on a substantial factual issue is clearly erroneous on the record and such error prejudicially affects the rights of a party.
(3) That the conduct of the hearing or any ruling made in connection with the proceeding has resulted in prejudicial error.
(4) That there are compelling reasons for reconsideration of an important Board rule or
policy.
RULES AND REGULATIONS, supra, at § 102.67(c). Therefore, to avoid straying outside the
parameters of established labor policy, see notes 130-136 iefra and accompanying text, the
court considering a§ IO(j) petition should not order temporary bargaining until the Board has
determined the appropriate bargaining unit with finality. The court should keep in mind the
fact that if the Board determines the bargaining unit before it adjudicates the case, a temporary
bargaining order could prevent irreparable harm from occurring in the interval between the
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even if it did irreparably injure the employer. The issue would then
become one of balancing the relative harms to the employer and the
union. The irreparable harm that the union and the employees suffer
Board's decision on the unit and the Board's decision on the case. See notes 67-70supra. For
these reasons, a stay is superior to a refusal to order temporary bargaining.
The Board's review of the Regional Director's decision would not significantly delay the
§ IO(j) proceedings. First, the problem seldom arises. The NLRB's records do not permit
exact calculations because bargaining unit decisions fall within the category of representational decisions. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra, at 261. But in 1979, of the Board's 1,820 decisions that adjudicated contested cases, only 147 could have involved a dispute over the
bargaining unit. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra, at 20. This conclusion follows from a comparison of the Board's criteria for reviewing the Regional Director's decisions on bargaining units
with the breakdo;wn of cases in the Annual Report. The Annual Report specifies three categories of decisions: (I) Decisions pursuant to transfers to the Board for initial consideration from
the Regional Directors; (2) Decisions pursuant to review of the Regional Directors' determinations; and (3) Decisions pursuant to objections and/or challenges by the parties. Since the
Board's review of decisions on bargaining units is discretionary, only the first two categories
could contain disputes over bargaining units. See RULES AND REGULATIONS, supra, at
§ 102.67(c). For 1980, the comparable fraction was 145 cases out of 1,857. NLRB, FORTY•
FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, cited in LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK (BNA) (1981) 266. For 1979, the comparable fraction was 138 cases out
of 1,762. NLRB, FORTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD 18 (1978). Because the Board rarely reviews the Regional Director's decision on bargaining units, a stay, if needed at all, would probably be quite short.
Second, to the extent that review is required, the issue would quickly be brought to the
Board's attention because a party must request review within ten days of the Regional Director's decision. RULES AND REGULATIONS,supra, at§ 102.67(b). Third, the Board could expedite its review of the Regional Director's determination in a§ JOG) case, since so few cases are
involved and since the Board's procedures clearly contemplate consideration of this issue apart
from the adjudication of unfair labor practices. RULES AND REGULATIONS, supra, at
§§ 102.67(c)-(j);seealso Boireex rel. NLRB v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1189
(5th Cir. 1975) (Board announced decision in unit clarification dispute before resolving unfair
labor practices question), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 934 (1976). Finally, the possibility of marginal
delay will be even less if the court grants a stay pending the completion of the hearings before
the adminstrative law judge. See note 136 infra.
A stay in the § IO(j) proceeding pending the Board's determination would be superior to
other ways in which the courts have responded to the question of a contested bargaining unit.
The Sixth Circuit simply ignored the issue in ordering bargaining in Levine ex rel NLRB v. C
& W Mining Co., 610 F.2d 432 (6th Cir. 1979). See Kaynard ex rel. NLRB v. Palby Lingerie,
Inc., 625 F.2d 1047, 1055 (2d Cir. 1980). The Second Circuit ordered bargaining despite the
fact that the Board had apparently decided to review the Regional Director's decision. 625
F.2d at 1054. The Second Circuit approved of bargaining because a "substantial basis [existed] for the Regional Director's unit determination." 625 F.2d at 1055. This "substantial
basis" test is inappropriate in cases where the Board has decided to review the Regional Director's determination of the bargaining unit. In precisely such cases, a "substantial basis" for the
Regional Director's determination will be lacking, because the Regional Director will have
determined the unit without guidance from the Board's previous decisions and summary affirmances.
On the other hand, at least one court that apparently would have otherwise been willing to
issue a temporary bargaining order refused to do so because the NLRB had not determined
the appropriate bargaining unit with finality. Taylor ex rel. NLRB v. Circo Resorts, Inc., 458
F. Supp. 152, 157 (D. Nev. 1978). Such denial runs the risk of creating a per se rule against
§ IO(j) bargaining orders in cases in which the employer disputes the bargaining unit. Aper se
rule, however, is unjustifiable. See note 127 infra. Whereas a stay would allow for a final
decision on the bargaining unit and would thus eliminate that dispute from the § IO(j) proceeding, a per se rule would enable some employers to escape temporary bargaining orders
merely by objecting to the Regional Director's determination of the bargaining unit. The prospect of temporary bargaining would thus turn on the timing of the§ IO(j) proceeding vis-a-vis
the Regional Director's hearing on the bargaining unit.
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in the Gissel situation absent a section lO(j) bargaining order90 outweighs the minimal, temporary, reparable harm and even the irreparable harm to the employer that section lO(j) relief might produce. 91
Thus, the balance of affected interests favors the issuance of a section
IO(j) bargaining order.
4. Preservation

of the Status Quo:

A Comparison

of Risks

A section lO(j) order is also appropriate because it would preserve the status quo, thereby ensuring the effectiveness of the Board's
final order. This conclusion becomes clear through an examination
of the possible outcomes that the courts and the Board could produce in a Gissel situation and a comparison of the risks that each of
these outcomes imposes on affected parties.
The courts have agreed that preservation of the status quo is the
goal of section lO(j) relief, 92 but they have stated this conclusion in
different ways. Some courts have defined the status quo as "the last
uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy."93
Other courts have defined it as "the status quo as it existed before the
onset of unfair labor practices." 94 Although these two different definitions do not necessarily entail different results, 95 the meaning of
90. See notes 59-65 supra and accompanying text.
91. The balance of interests would still favor the§ lO(j) bargaining order. First, the likelihood of an unconditional collective bargaining agreement is low, since, by supposition, the
employer's unfair labor practices have weakened the union's bargaining strength. See note 86
supra. Second, the court considering the § lO(j) petition must discount the potential irreparable harm to the employer by the probability that the Board will ultimately not issue a Gissel
bargaining order. See note 72 supra. The risk that the Board will not issue a subsequent
bargaining order has been very low in cases where the courts have granted § lO(j) bargaining
orders. See note 134 infra. The courts can ensure that this risk remains low by ordering
temporary bargaining only in situations similar to those for which the Board has previously
issued Gissel bargaining orders. See notes 130-36 i,!fra and accompanying text. Third, the
systemic interest in deterring unfair labor practices also weighs in favor of the courts' placing
the risk of irreparable harm on the employer. The risk provides an incentive for employers to
fight unionization through the electoral process rather than through unfair labor practices.
92. See, e.g., Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1975); Boire ex rel. NLRB v. Pilot
Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976);
Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Meter ex rel. NLRB, 385 F.2d 265, 270 (8th Cir. 1967);
Angle v. Sacks ex rel. NLRB, 382 F.2d 655,660 (10th Cir. 1967). The courts have relied on the
legislative history of lO(j) in reaching this conclusion:
Since the Board's orders are not self-enforcing, it has sometimes been possible for persons
violating the Act to accomplish their unlawful objective before being placed under any
legal restraint and thereby to make it impossible or not feasible to restore or preserve the
status quo pending litigation.
s. REP. No. 105 at 27, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, LMRA, at 433, supra. note 25 (emphasis added). Although the statement refers literally to § lO(e) proceedings, it applies to
§ lO(j) as well. See note 25 supra.
93. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Meter ex rel. NLRB, 385 F.2d 265, 273 (8th Cir.
1967) (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Free Sewing Machine Co., 256 F.2d 806, 808 (7th
Cir. 1958)).
94. Seeler ex rel. NLRB v. Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1975); accord Levine ex rel. NLRB v. C & W Mining Co., 610 F.2d 432, 437 (6th Cir. 1979).
95. The two definitions are not logically incompatible and do not necessitate different re-
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the phrase "status quo" has produced conflict among the courts. In
fact, the conventional wisdom about section IO(j) suggests that the
split over the propriety of section 1O(j) Gissel bargaining orders
stems from confusion over what temporal status such orders are to
restore. 96 lnBoire ex rel NLRB v. Pilot Freight Carriers, 91 for examsuits, because the two definitions can refer to the same interval of time. Suppose a valid majority of employees sign authorization cards during the union's organizational drive. The
employer demands that the union petition for a representational election. See note 80 supra.
Both sides conduct a campaign, and a representational election is held. The union loses the
election and files charges with the Regional Director. After an investigation, the Regional
Director issues a complaint against the employer alleging that during the campaign the employer engaged in unfair labor practices that made a fair election unlikely. The Regional
Director seeks from the Board an order requiring the employer to bargain with the union
based on the union's card majority. In the administrative proceedings, the employer does not
contest the card majority. Instead, the employer denies that it engaged in any unfair labor
practices and that even if it did, their effects were not sufficiently severe under Gissel to trigger
an obligation to bargain. See notes 41-46 supra and accompanying text. Therefore, the em•
ployer contends, the most the Board should order is a second election. The "pending controversy," see note 93 supra and accompanying text, before the Board consists of a question of
fact and two questions of policy. The question of fact is whether certain events occurred. The
two questions of policy are, first, whether, assuming certain events occurred, those events constituted unfair labor practices and, second, whether the effects of those unfair labor practices
were sufficiently severe to make a fair election unlikely. See note 128 i,!fra.
Since the employer does not deny that a valid majority of the employees signed authorization cards, the last uncontested status includes the interval between the time at which the
employees signed the cards and the time at which the alleged unfair labor practices occurred.
This interval, the "last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy," see note
93 supra and accompanying text, ends precisely when the events alleged to be unfair labor
practices occurred and includes the status quo "as it existed before the onset of the unfair labor
practices." Therefore, the two ostensibly different definitions of the status quo do not necessarily demarcate mutually exclusive intervals of time.
In fact, in the first two appellate cases involving§ JOG) Gissel bargaining orders, the courts
used these ostensibly different definitions of the status quo but cited the same case, Minnesota
Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Meter ex rel NLRB, 382 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1967), in support of their
definitions. Compare Seeler ex rel. NLRB v. Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1975)
(drawing from the effect of the ruling in Minnesota Mining), with Boire ex rel. NLRB v. Pilot
Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1194 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976)
(quoting directly from the Minnesota Mining court).
The Fifth Circuit has, however, demarcated a time period different from that of the status
quo "as it existed before the onset of unfair labor practices." Boire ex rel. NLRB v, Pilot
Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1194 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976),
After defining the status quo as the "last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy," the court equated the word "controversy" with the employees' signing of the authorization cards. 515 F.2d at 1194. Under this definition, the status quo ends just prior to the
signing of cards. The other definition of the status quo, the status quo "as it existed before the
onset of unfair labor practices" does not have a definite beginning point. Therefore, it could
overlap with the status quo prior to the signing of cards. The courts, however, have not con•
strued it to overlap. See cases ci'iea-at note 99 i,!fra (status quo begins after signing of cards).
In short, the courts have construed the definitions of the status quo to demarcate different
intervals of time, even though the language of the definitions does not compel this result.
96. See, e.g., Pettibone, The Sec. JO(j) Bargaining Order in Gissel-Type Cases, 27 LAB. L.J.
648,660 (1976); Note, Section JO(j) of the National Labor Relations Act: increased Exercise of
Federal Jurisdiction Over Labor Disputes, supra note 34, at 424-45; Note, The Use of Section
JO(j) ofthe Labor-Management Relations Act in Employer Refusal-to-Bargain Cases, supra note
34, at 854; Note, Section JO(j) ofthe National Labor Relations Act: A Legislative, Administralil'e
and Judicial Look at a Potentially E_ffective (But Seldom Used) Remedy, supra note 34, at 1043;
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ple, the Fifth Circuit manipulated the phrase "pending controversy,"
to advance an untenable definition of the status quo. By finding that
the signing of union authorization cards precipitated the "controversy," the Pilot Freight court in effect penalized the union for the
employer's unlawful conduct.98 Other courts have used "preservation of the status quo" as a conclusory label and have created the
erroneous impression that preservation requires the court simply to
turn back the wheels of time. 99
Indeed, the courts have persistently defined the status quo as a set
of conditions existing at some previous time 100 without addressing
34 A.L.R. FED. 818,824 (1971);seealso Levine ex rel NLRB v. C & W Mining Co., 610 F.2d
434, 437 (6th Cir. 1979).
97. 515 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976).
98. See 515 F.2d at I 194. The organizational drive of the union, as long as the union does
not coerce or mislead employees into signing cards, does not amount to a "controversy" or a
labor dispute. Section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), grants employees the rights "to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining . . . ." In equating the legitimate organizational efforts of the
union with a legal "controversy," thereby casting an aura of disapprobation over the union's
right to solicit support, the Pilot Freight court ran roughshod over the policies that the NLRA
promotes and the rights it establishes.
An interpretation of the word "controversy" as meaning the issue of whether the union had
obtained a card majority is also implausible in this case. In the § lO(i) proceeding, the employer did not contest the validity of the card majority, and the employer did not demand that
the union petition for a representational election. 515 F.2d at 1190-91.
Thus, the Fifth Circuit, in defining the status quo as "the last uncontested status which
preceded the pending controversy," 515 F.2d at 1194, manipulated the word "controversy" so
as to ignore the union's card majority. If a court applying this definition of the status quo
chooses to ignore a union·s card majority, it will always refuse to issue a bargaining order. See,
e.g., Fuchs ex rel. NLRB v. Steel-Fab, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 385, 387 (D. Mass. 1973) ("[T]he
status quo presently is one where the Union does not represent the [employer's] employees.").
99. Courts defining the status quo "as it existed before the onset of unfair labor practices,"
see note 94 supra, have ordered bargaining in recognition of the card majority that existed
before the unfair labor practices. These courts have ignored the fact that such an order imposes a set of reciprocal rights and duties that did not previously exist. See, e.g., Seeler ex rel.
NLRB v. Trading Port, Inc. 517 F.2d 33, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[I]t is essential not to freeze the
present situation, but rather to 're-establish the conditions as they existed before the employer's
unlawful campaign.' Those previous conditions constitute the status quo which the courts
should restore through the issuance of a bargaining order under§ I0(i).") (quoting Gissel, 395
U.S. at 612); Levine ex rel. NLRB v. C & W Mining Co., 465 F. Supp. 690, 694 (N.D. Ohio)
("In issuing a bargaining order, the Court is preserving the status quo as it existed just before
the start of the unfair labor practices."), mod[,fietl 610 F.2d 432 (6th Cir. 1979); Taylor ex rel.
NLRB v. Circo Resorts, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 152, 156 (D. Nev. 1978) ("[A]n interim bargaining
order returns the parties to a point in time when the union had majority support; a point in
time before the union's strength was dissipated by employer unfair labor practices.") As long
as the court ignores the imposition bf a new bargaining obligation, this definition of the status
quo will always justify a bargaining order.
100. That courts have used a temporal framework is not suprising, even if not helpful. The
legislative history suggests a temporal framework for the § lO(i) status quo drawn by analogy
from the§ IO(e) status quo. "Since the Board's orders are not self-enforcing, it has sometimes
been possible for persons violating the act to accomplish their unlawful objective before being
placed under any legal restraint and thereby to make it impossible or not feasible to restore or
preserve the status quo pending litigation." S. REP. No. 105 at 27, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, LMRA at 433, supra note 25. Although this language applies to § lO(i), it refers to
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the reason why the status quo must be preserved. Although this temporal framework may be appropriate in some cases, 101 it fails in the
Gissel situation. Before the occurrence of the alleged unfair labor
practices, a majority of employees will have indicated their support
for the union via authorization cards, but the reciprocal rights and
duties of an employer-union bargaining relationship will not exist.
By the time the section 100) hearing takes place, the union may no
longer have the support of a majority of the employees. A status quo
defined in temporal terms thus creates a dilemma for the court considering a section 100) petition. If the court does not order bargaining, it will fail to recognize the previously existent card majority, a
majority that, according to the Supreme Court, deserves protection. 102 But if the court does order bargaining, it imposes previously
nonexistent reciprocal rights and duties on both the employer and
the union. 103 Thus, the court cannot place all of the parties in the
§ IO(e). See note 25 supra. Because Congress designed§ IO(e) to prevent harm between the
Board's order and subsequent enforcement litigation, the phrase "pending litigation" refers to
the interval between the Board's order and the judicial enforcement decree. The§ IO(e) status
quo, then, is the legal position of the panies as established by the Board's order. By analogy,
the § IO(j) status quo would be the position of the panies prior to the commission of unfair
labor practices. The analogy comes from Congress' symmetrical treatment of the interval between unfair labor practices and the Board's adjudication and the interval between the Board's
adjudication and judicial enforcement. See note 25 supra.
The analogy, however, does not work. The purpose of§ lO(e) is to preserve the effectiveness of the Board's order pending judicial enforcement. See note 25 supra. Because the
Board's order has established the legal positions of the panies, preservation of the effectiveness
of the Board's order also preserves the positions of the panies. Because the remedial purpose
of§ lO(e) converges with the legal positions of the panies, a temporal framework for § lO(e)
makes sense.
The § lO(j) setting is different. The Board has not yet established the legal positions of the
panies. These positions might not be the same as those that existed prior to the unfair labor
practices. For example, the Board could order bargaining, imposing a set of rights and duties
that did not previously exist. Whereas§ lO(e) operates retrospectively to restore the efficacy of
the Board's order,§ lO(j) operates prospectively to preserve it. See note 25 supra; text at note
105 i'!fra. Consequently, in the § I0(j) setting, preservation of the effectiveness of the Board's
order need not preserve the legal positions of the panies, because the Board's order has not yet
even established those positions. The remedial purpo~e of§ lO(j) does not converge with the
positions of the panies prior to the§ I0(j) proceeding. Therefore, the analogy breaks down. A
temporal framework for the § lO(j) status quo does not make sense.
101. For example, reinstatement of a wrongfully discharged employee preserves the status
quo as between employer and employee.
102. See notes 41-46 supra and accompanying text.
103. See Kaynard v. Lawrence Rigging, Inc., 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2600, 2605 (E.D.N.Y.
1972).
The coun in Boire ex rel NLRB v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976), properly recognized the dilemma between protecting
the union's majority suppon and imposing a bargaining relationship:
No matter how this coun decides the interim bargaining issue, one of the panies
stands to be "hun." If [the employer is] required to bargain with the [union] now, our
order might prove highly prejudicial to the employers' interests if the Board later determines the union does not enjoy representative status. Similarly, if we fail to require bargainingpendente lite, the union will have lost several months of representational services it
could have performed on behalf of the employees . . . . Faced with Scylla and Charybdis, we choose to await the Board's pronouncement.
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positions that they held before the alleged unfair labor practices. 104
In contrast to this deficient, temporal framework, the remedial
purpose of section lOG) gives prescriptive value to the goal of preserving the status quo. Congress designed section 1OG) to prevent
the infliction of intervening irreparable harm that would render the
Board's final order ineffective. 105 Because section lOG) operates prospectively to insure the effectiveness of the Board's order, the notion
that it should preserve the position of the parties prior to that order
is not necessarily correct. Rather, section 1OG) relief properly preserves the status quo to the extent that it establishes conditions under
which the Board can issue an effective final order. 106
To determine what these conditions are, a court considering a
section lOG) petition must compare the risks inherent in the outcomes that the court's and the Board's decisions might produce. The
court has two options: to issue or not to issue a temporary bargaining order. The Board, in its administrative proceedings, also has two
options: to issue or not to issue a Gissel bargaining order. Thus,
four outcomes are ultimately possible: (I) neither the court nor the
Board orders bargaining; or (2) both the court and the Board order
bargaining; or (3) the court does not order bargaining, but the Board
does; or (4) the court orders bargaining, but the Board does not. In
attempting to preserve the status quo, the court should consider
whether the Board's final order will be effective in each of these four
possible outcomes.
The- comparative risks in these four cases favor a section lOG)
bargaining o:rder. Outcomes (1) and (2) pose no problems. In outcome (1), the union is not entitled to protection from whatever loss
of support it may have suffered from the absence of section lOG)
relief. 107 In outcome (2), the employer will not have suffered any
harm from which it is entitled to protection pending the Board's de515 F.2d at 1194. Given this recognition, an explanation for the Pilot Freight result better than
that provided by the court's prestidigitation with the word "controversy" emerges. See note 98
supra. The court may have decided that the risk ofimposing a temporary bargaining relationship on the parties outweighed the risk of the employees' loss of support for the union.
104. q. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 201 (1930) (Speaking
about temporary injunctions against strikes, the authors observe that such an "injunction cannot preserve the so-called status quo; the situation does not remain in equilibrium awaiting
judgment upon full knowledge.").
105. See notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text.
106. Congress intended to prevent irremediable violations of the NLRA. See note 26
supra. If the Board cannot remedy violations, its adjudication is useless. Congress labelled
the conditions under which the Board's order would be ineffective as destruction of the status
quo. See note 25 supra. Therefore, preservation of the status quo requires conditions under
which the Board can effectively adjudicate the case.
107. This result would obtain only if the Board decided that the unfair labor practices did
not meet the Gissel standard of severity. See notes 41-46 supra and accompanying text.
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cision, 108 and the court's order will have prevented irreparable diminution of the union's bargaining strength. 109 Thus, the court need
not consider harms accruing from an order consistent with the
Board's final order.
The crucial comparison of risks arises for the two possible outcomes in which the court's decision differs from the Board's. Where
the court does not order bargaining, but the Board does (outcome 3),
the court will have failed to prevent irreparable diminution of the
union's strength, a harm that the Board has concluded will destroy
the effectiveness of its Gissel order. 110
Against this harm, the court must weigh the injuries that section
IOG) would produce if the Board later decided not to order bargaining (outcome 4). In this situation, a court would have to determine
whether its section IOG) relief would prevent the Board from effectively ordering that the employer is not obligated to bargain with the
union.
Because a bargaining order does not compel the parties to reach
an agreement, 111 the effects of the section 1OG) relief would depend
on whether the union and the employer actually reach a collective
bargaining agreement prior to the Board's decision. If the parties do
not reach an agreement prior to the Board's decision, the Board's
order dissolving the section IOG) injunction 112 should effectively repair any harm to the employer. The only injury that the temporary
bargaining order might impose on the employer would be an increase in employee support for the union. The employer might, as a
consequence, be more susceptible to another organizational drive
than he would have been in the absence of section IOG) relief. But
this increased susceptibility to unionization does not constitute a
harm from which the employer is entitled to legal protection. 113 The
108. See notes 10 & 60 supra. This outcome has occurred in every case in which the appel•
late court sustained the district court's§ lO(i) bargaining order. See notes 117 & 134 infra.
109. See note 68 supra.
llO. See notes 67-70 supra and accompanying text.
111. Collective bargaining involves
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement,
or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating
any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession . . . .
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). "[T]he Act . . . does not contemplate that unions will always be
secure and able to achieve agreement even when their economic position is weak, or that
strikes and lockouts will never result from a bargaining impasse." H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB,
397 U.S. 99, 109 (1970).
112. See note 83 supra.
113. The temporary bargaining order may have increased the union's support, either
through the mere presence of a bargaining agent or through the union's actual or perceived
attainment of benefits. But given that the NLRA is designed to facilitate the employees' free
choice of bargaining representatives and to protect the collective bargaining process, see 29
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employer will be more susceptible only if the employees perceive the
union as having effectively represented them while the parties bargained.114 Under these circumstances, the employees' desire for a
union falls within the ambit of the NLRA's protection, 115 since the
NLRA establishes the employees' right to designate a union as their
bargaining representative. 116 The employer cannot claim that the
Board's final order is ineffective merely because it does not permit
the employer to eradicate the employees' desire for a union.
If, on the other hand, the parties have entered into a collective
bargaining agreement by the time the Board determines that the employer has no duty to bargain, an additional harm will materialize.
The collective bargaining agreement will probably have increased
the employees' compensation at the employer's expense. 117 This
possibility does not, however, prevent the bargaining relationship
from terminating without irreparably harming the employer, since
the employer should be able to insist that the duration of the agreement and the transfer of its benefits be conditioned on the issuance
of a Gissel bargaining order. 118
Thus, the acid test for determining whether a section lOG) order
will establish a set of conditions under which the Board can enter an
effective order arises when the Board's final decision differs from
that of the court hearing the section lOG) petition. The Board has
determined that, absent section lOG) relief, the union in a Gissel situation will suffer irreparable harm. 119 The harm that a temporary
bargaining order imposes on an employer, on the other hand, dissolves along with the Board's termination of the section lOG) injunction and the collective bargaining agreement. 120 The comparative
U.S.C. § 151 (1976), the small harm that the employer suffers because the union has been able
to showcase its effectiveness does not warrant much solicitude.
114. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612-13 n.33 (1969).
115. Congress enacted the LMRA to encourage collective bargaining and to protect "the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment or other mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
I 16. See note 4 supra.
117. No employer has ever suffered this harm. With one exception, the Board has issued
Gissel bargaining orders in all cases for which the courts have issued § lO(j) bargaining orders.
See, e.g., Circo Resorts, Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. 880, 888-89 (1979); Old Angus, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B.
539, 539 (1974); cases cited in note 134 infra. The one exception is Liberty Homes, Inc., 257
N.L.R.B. No. 169, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1074, 1076 (1981). The Board dismissed the charges
against the employer before the appellate court decided the§ 10(j) appeal. The appellate court
vacated the § lO(j) bargaining order as moot. Wilson ex rel. NLRB v. Liberty Homes, Inc.,
109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2492, 2493 (7th Cir. 1982) (referring to an unpublished order of November 19, 1981). The parties did not reach a bargaining agreement prior to the Board's decision.
108 L.R.R.M. at 1076 n.10.
I 18. See notes 83-86 supra and accompanying text.
I 19. See notes 67-70 supra and accompanying text.
120. See notes 83-86 supra and accompanying text.
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risks of irreparable harm always weigh decisively in favor of a temporary bargaining order to ensure that the Board's final order will be
effective. 121 Thus, even where the Board eventually refuses to issue a
bargaining order, section IO(j) relief will have preserved the status
quo. The section IO(j) bargaining order, then, will always be just in
the Gissel situation.
B. Proper Relief: The Delegation Limitation

Although a temporary bargaining order is always ''just" in a Gissel situation, 122 it is proper only in situations that indicate, based on
the Board's past decisions, a high probability that the Board will
eventually issue a Gissel bargaining order. This limit on the propriety of section lO(j) relief stems from the fact that Congress delegated
the authority to formulate labor policy to the Board, not to the
courts. 123
In recognition ohhis delegation, some courts have been reluctant
to issue any section lO(j) relief other than to order the discontinuance of unfair labor practices. 124 Fearing that preliminary affirmative relief would usurp the Board's delegated authority, these courts
claim to be "impotent to adjudicate the controlling substantive
issues." 125
This formulation of the delegation limitation contains two flaws.
First, the court considering the section lO(j) petition does not adjudicate any issue with finality. Because section lO(j) relief does not bar
any subsequent administrative proceedings on the issue, 126 the Board
is free to reach a conclusion contrary to that of the district court.
Second, the "preliminary decisions" test is overbroad. Even courts
issuing only cease and desist orders must make a preliminary decision on the existence of unfair labor practices, and a distinction between this preliminary decision and others cannot be justified. 127
121. See notes 90-91 supra and accompanying text.
122. That is, the goals of the NLRA will be frustrated without a § IO(i) bargaining order
and the equitable balance of harms will always favor such relief. See text following note SI &
notes 55-121 supra and accompanying text.
123. See cases cited in notes SO & 69 supra.
124. See cases cited in note SO supra.
125. Kaynard ex rel NLRB v. Steel Fabricators Assn., 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2015, 2019
(E.D.N.Y. 1976); see cases cited in note SO supra.
126. See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 681-83 (1951)
(referring to § 10(1)). The court in Boire ex rel. NLRB v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. SIS F.2d
1185, 1194 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976), noted that "were we to order
bargaining on the record before this court, our decision would rest on the assumption that (the
employer] had actually commmitted unfair labor practices-an assumption we are unwilling
to make." But the assumption is unnecessary, because a temporary bargaining order does not
prevent the Board from eventually ordering an election instead of a Gissel bargaining order.
The court considering the § IO(j) petition does not impose the restrictions of res judicata or
collateral estoppel on the Board.
127. Because§ IO(i) relief precedes the Board's adjudication, every§ IO(i) court will have
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This formulation of the delegation limitation also has the effect of
erecting a per se rule against section IOG) bargaining orders; a court
that refuses to rule on preliminary policy decisions that the Board
must ultimately make would never issue such relief. 128 This outcome
would frustrate the purposes of the NLRA. 129
A superior formulation of the delegation limitation would reto make preliminary decisions on matters which only the Board can adjudicate with finality.
For example, every§ IO(j) court must make preliminary determinations both on the question
of the existence of unfair labor practices and on the other questions of policy that comprise the
petitioner's legal theory. See note 16 supra and note 128 iefra. No reason exists for distinguishing the question of unfair labor practices from the other questions in the legal theory. In
both cases, the§ IO(j) court must make policy, ie., it must make a prescriptive judgment based
on legal standards as applied to facts. See note 128 iefra. And in both cases, the temporary
relief involved is designed to protect the effectiveness of the Board's order. See notes 22-28
supra and accompanying text. Therefore, the§ IO(j) courts should not treat other questions in
the petitioner's legal theory differently from the question of unfair labor practices by using the
former to erect a per se rule against § I O(j) bargaining orders.
128. The Board will order bargaining only if it determines that three elements are met:
first, that the union obtained a valid card majority in its organizational drive; second, that
unfair labor practices occurred, and third, that the severity of the unfair labor practices justifies
a Gissel bargaining order. See notes 41-46 supra and accompanying text.
The first element poses a question of fact and a question of policy. The question of fact
concerns the contents of the cards and the circumstances under which they were solicited. The
question of policy is whether the cards satisfy the Board's standards. See note 75 supra. The
second element, whether the conduct in question constitutes unfair labor practices, poses a
question of fact and a question of policy. The question of fact is whether certain events occurred. The question of policy is whether those events constitute unfair labor practices. The
third element, whether the unfair labor practices meet the Gissel standard of severity, poses a
question of policy, requiring a prescriptive judgment based on the Gissel legal standard and
the facts.
In a § IO(j) proceeding, the petitioner contends, on the three questions of policy posed by
the three elements, that (1) subsequent to the union's obtaining a valid card majority, (2) the
employer committed unfair labor practices (3) sufficiently severe to justify a Gissel bargaining
order.
Thus, the § IO(j) petitioner's policy determinations overlap with the decisions the Board
must make in deciding whether to issue a Gissel bargaining order. A court refusing to rule on
preliminary policy decisions that the Board must ultimately make would never grant a § IO(j)
bargaining order.
The Fifth Circuit may well have established such a per se rule:
[C]ertification of the union as bargaining representative [is a matter] generally left to the
administrative expertise of the Board.
While courts have not hesitated to issue interim bargaining orders where a pre-established
bargaining relationship is being eroded by unfair labor practices, the considerations are
very different when the union's representative status has not been certified.
Boire ex rel. NLRB v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1192, 1194 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976) (citations omitted). The requirement of the Board's certification of the union would create a per se rule against § IO(j) bargaining orders in Gissel situations, since the Board would certify the union only as a result of its administrative
adjudication. See Levine ex rel. NLRB v. C & W Mining Co., 610 F.2d 432, 436 (6th Cir.
1979); notes 38-41 supra and accompanying text. The Pilot Freight court, however, did not
actually announce a per se rule: "Additional reasons underlie our decision to refrain from
commanding temporary bargaining." 515 F.2d at 1194. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit's reluctance to make preliminary decisions on matters that the Board must ultimately decide is one of
the reasons for the split between the Fifth Circuit and the Second and Sixth Circuits over
§ IO(j) bargaining orders.
129. See notes 55-70 supra and accompanying text.
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quire the section IOG) petitioner to show a high probability that the
Board will ultimately issue a Gissel bargaining order. 130 This showing, based on past decisions of the Board, would preserve the
Board's delegated authority to make labor policy. 131 The court considering the section IOG) petition would not make new labor policy;
rather, it would order bargaining only where the Board's previous
adjudications had already established the severity of unfair labor
practices required to justify a Gissel bargaining order. 132 A section
130. The elements of the § IO(j) petitioner's legal theory correspond to the elements necessary for a Gissel bargaining order. See note 128 supra.
131. A pattern emerges from the Board's Gissel decisions. This pattern enables the court
considering the § IO(j) motion to predict with a high degree of accuracy whether the Board will
issue a Gissel bargaining order. A pattern can clearly emerge if the cases present recurring fact
situations. As the cases cited in notes 59 & 117 supra and 134 infra indicate, the situations
leading to petitions for§ I0(j) bargaining orders display remarkable similarity. They typically
involve the employer's discharge of card signers, interrogations, threats of closing, and surveillance of the union's organizational efforts. Similarity exists even though, according to the
Board, there is "no per se rule that the commission of any unfair labor practice will automatically result in... the issuance of an order to bargain." NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S.
575,615 (1969). Courts themselves have recognized the recurring nature of unfair labor practices. See, e.g., Kaynard ex rel. NLRB v. Palby Lingerie, Inc., 625 F.2d 1047, 1054 (2d Cir.
1980) (" 'textbook case'") (quoting Regional Director ofNLRB's Region 29); Barbour v. Central Cartage, Inc., 583 F.2d 335, 336 (5th. Cir. 1978) ("textbook series of unfair labor practices"); NLRB v. Armcor Indus., Inc., 535 F.2d 239, 240 (3d Cir. I 976) ("The scenario of this
proceeding has been played frequently on the industrial scene."); Gottfried ex rel. NLRB v.
Mayco Plastics, Inc., 472 F.Supp. 1161, 1163 (E.D. Mich. 1979), ("classic sorts of unfair labor
practices"), qffd. without opinion, 615 F.2d 1360 (6th Cir. 1980). Moreover, with one exception,
they have erred only in predicting that the Board would not issue a Gissel bargaining order
when the Board in fact did. See notes 117 supra and 134 infra.
132. This formulation of the delegation limitation requires the court considering the § IO(j)
petition to determine whether the employer's unfair labor practices fall within the bounds of
established labor policy for Gissel bargaining orders. See note 131 supra. To make this determination, the court must compare its case to past Board Gissel cases. If the situation is one for
which the Board has not yet clearly established a labor policy as to whether a Gissel order
should issue, the delegation limitation forbids the§ I0(j) court from making even a preliminary policy decision. But if the case falls within the bounds of established labor policy, the
§ I0(j) court need not fear that it might violate the delegation limitation. It will not usurp the
Board's delegated authority to make labor policy, because the Board's past decisions have
already established the policy for those unfair labor practices.
The delegation limitation automatically forbids § JOG) bargaining orders for those novel
situations in which the Board's decision will be difficult to predict. In Gissel, for example, the
Supreme Court acknowledged in dicta the possibility that in "exceptional" cases marked by
"outrageous" and "pervasive" unfair labor practices, the Board could order bargaining even
though the union had never obtained a card majority. 395 U.S. at 613-14. In 1982 the Board,
for the first time, ordered bargaining without a card majority. Conair Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. No.
178, I 10 L.R.R.M. (BNA) I 161 (1982). The employer's unfair labor practices included:
Numerous threats of plant closure, discharge, and loss of benefits; numerous promises of
increased or new benefits; coercive interrogation of employees; numerous acts of soliciting
employee grievance with promises to remedy the same; grants of numerous benefits to
employees; creating the impression of surveillance; the failure to give timely reinstatement
to 36 unfair labor practice strikers; and the outright discharge and refusal to reinstate 16
other unfair labor practice strikers.
110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1163. The labor policy for bargaining orders in cases in which the
union does not obtain a card majority is embryonic. It will develop and become established
only as the Board decides more cases. Until the Board does so, however, the courts consider•
ing § IO(j) petitions will not be able to predict, on the basis of the Board's past decisions, which
cases justify a bargaining order in the absence of a card majority. Until the Board establishes
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IO(j) bargaining order issued under this high probability standard 133
would fall within the bounds of the delegation limitation because it
would fall within the bounds of established labor policy. 134 The rea pattern, the § I0(j) court should not venture outside the parameters of the established labor
policy by ordering bargaining where the union has never obtained a card majority.
Theoretically, the delegation limitation also applies to the petitioner's contention that the
union obtained a valid card majority, since this determination poses a question oflabor policy.
But practically, the labor policy on cards is so extensively established, see note 75 supra, that
the question of validity often turns solely on the facts. Not surprisingly, therefore, the § lO(j)
courts faced with a dispute over the validity of the card majority have used the reasonable
cause standard to judge the factual claims of validity. See Hirsch ex rel. NLRB v. Trim Lean
Meat Prods., 479 F. Supp. 1351, 1358 (D. Del. 1979); Kaynard v. Lawrence Rigging, Inc., 80
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2600, 2602 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
Little turns on which standard the courts use. Cards raise questions of fact, but the
factfinding preceding the § lO(j) hearing should enable the court to identify the rare cases
where the determination on the existence of the card majority falls outside the bounds of
established labor policy. First, the Regional Director must make a preliminary investigation
of the cards before seeking§ I0(j) relief. See notes 5 & 41-46 supra and accompanying text.
Thus, the court considering the § lO(j) petition has the benefit of the fact-finding expertise of
the prosecutorial branch of the NLRB. The recurring nature of card situations enables the
§ IO(j) court to predict whether the Board will find a valid card majority.
Moreover, the court considering the § lO(j) petition may also have access to the record
compiled in the Administrative Law Judge hearings, which gives the court high quality information to decide on the cards. The record also obviates the need for judicial factfinding in an
area covered by the expertise of the adjudicatory branch of the NLRB. See note 136 infra.
Finally, if a novel question concerning the validity of cards does arise, the § lO(j) court should
refuse to issue the bargaining order.
133. This condition is also one of the traditional equitable criteria for a temporary injunction. See note 72 supra.
134. The delegation limitation functions as a check on the prosecutorial discretion of the
General Counsel in seeking, and on the Board in authorizing, § lO(j) petitions. The limitation
should insure that the Board's screening guidelines prevent it from seeking temporary bargaining orders for unfair labor practices lacking the severity requisite to the issuance of a Gissel
bargaining order.
The Board's current guidelines, see note 20 supra, conform to the delegation limitation.
These guidelines have led the Board to seek § lO(j) bargaining orders only in cases involving
alleged unfair labor practices that were severe enough to justify the Board's subsequent issuance of Gissel bargaining orders. See, e.g., Kaynard ex rel. NLRB v. Palby Lingerie, Inc., 625
F.2d 1047, 1050, 1053-54 (2d Cir. 1980) (discharges, interrogations, surveillance, threats of
closing, discriminatory job assignments); Levine ex rel. NLRB v. C & W Mining Co., 610 F.2d
432, 434-35 (6th Cir. 1979) (discharges, interrogations, surveillance, threats of closing, discriminatory job assignments); Seeler ex rel. NLRB v. Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir.
1975) (mass discharge of union supporters); Boire ex rel. NLRB v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc.,
515 F.2d I 185, 1190-91 (5th Cir. 1975) (discharges, discriminatory changes in compensation),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976); Wilson v. Liberty Homes, Inc., 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2688,
2690-91 (W.D. Wis. 1980) (mass discharge of union supporters), order vacated as moot and
opinion withdrawn as moot, I 09 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2492 (7th Cir. 1982); Gottfried ex rel. NLRB
v. Mayco Plastics, Inc., 472 F. Supp. I 161, 1162-63 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (mass discharges of
union supporters, interrogations, surveillance, discriminatory job assignments, and changes in
compensation), qffd mem., 615 F.2d 1360 (6th Cir. 1980); Hirsch ex rel. NLRB v. Trim Lean
Meat Prods., 479 F. Supp. 1351, 1351-53 (D. Del. 1979) (mass discharge, interrogations,
threats of closing, surveillance); Smith ex rel. NLRB v. Old Angus, Inc., 81 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2936, 2941 (D. Md. 1972) (discharge, surveillance); Fuchs ex rel. NLRB v. Steel-Fab, Inc., 356
F. Supp. 385, 387 (D. Mass. 1973); Kaynard v. Lawrence Rigging, Inc., 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2600, 2600-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (discharges, interrogation).
The facts of these cases and their subsequent disposition before the Board indicate that a
difference in severity of the unfair labor practices cannot explain the split over-§ lO(j) Gissel
bargaining orders. The Fifth Circuit declined to distinguish the cases on their facts when it
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suiting limitation would prevent the federal district courts from using section lOG) petitions to make new labor policy. 135 The high
faced a petition for rehearing on its denial of a § l0(i) bargaining order in Pilot Freight, 515
F.2d at 1185. The petitioner contended that the Pilot Freight court had failed to consider the
Second Circuit's issuance of a§ IO(i) bargaining order in Trading Port 511, F.2d at 33. The
Fifth Circuit, in denying the motion for rehearing, did not try to distinguish the cases on their
facts. Instead, the Fifth Circuit indicated that the dispute was legal, not factual, by stating that
it had considered Trading Port "but did not totally agree with it. To the extent that our reasoning differs from the Second Circuit's rationale we decline to follow it." Boire ex rel. NLRB
v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 521 F.2d 795, 795 (5th Cir. 1975).
As a further indication that factual differences in unfair labor practices cannot explain the
split over § IO(i) Gissel bargaining orders, the Fifth Circuit upheld the Board's Gissel bargaining order in a case involving many of the same unfair labor practices as Pilot Freight. See
Bandag, Inc. v. NLRB, 583 F.2d 765, 771 (5th Cir. 1978). Bandag indicates that the Fifth
Circuit probably would have upheld the Board's Gissel bargaining order in Pilot Freight had
the case come before it. This likelihood is yet another reason why a difference in the severity
of unfair labor practites cannot explain the split over § IO(i) Gissel bargaining orders. In fact,
even in the cases in which the courts denied § IO(i) bargaining orders, the Board ultimately
issued Gissel bargaining orders. See Great Chinese-American Sewing Co., 222 N.L.R.B. 1670,
1670-71 (1977), qffd 578 F.2d 251, 256 (9th Cir. 1978); Newton Joseph, 225 N.L.R.B. 294
(1976); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 223 N.L.RB. 286 (1976); Steel-Fab, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. 363
(1974); Lawrence Rigging, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 1094 (1973).
The Board has also issued Gissel orders in every case in which the appellate court has
sustained the district court's § IO(i) bargaining order. See Palby Lingerie, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B.
176, 177 (1980); C & W Mining Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 270, 274 (1980) Trading Post, Inc., 219
N.L.R.B. 298, 300-01 (1975); see also cases cited in note 117 supra; cf. Barbour v. Central
Cartage, Inc., 583 F.2d 335, 336 (7th Cir. 1978) (§ l0(i) order vacated as moot because Board
had issued a Gissel bargaining order by the time of the appellate decision.).
Finally, in limiting petitions for § IO(i) Gissel bargaining orders to situations similar to
those for which the Board has ordered bargaining, the § IO(i) petitioner, though acting in a
prosecutorial capacity, draws on the expertise of the Board as an adjudicatory agency. As an
adjudicatory agency, the Board is entitled to great judicial deference. See note 69 supra. The
Board, of course, explicitly follows the Supreme Court's requirements, see notes 41-46 supra
and accompanying text, in its administrative adjudication, see, e.g., Stcel-Fab, Inc., 212
N.L.R.B. 363, 365 (1974), and the Board has stringently upheld the Gissel requirement on the
severity of the effects of unfair labor practices. See note 81 supra.
135. The Secon~ Circuit has refused to issue § IO(i) orders where to do so would lead it
outside the bounds of established labor policy. The Second Circuit has couched its analysis in
terms of "deference" to the § IO(i) petitioner. If the petition requires the court to act outside
the bounds of established labor policy, the court refuses to "defer" to the petitioner's policy
determinations. The label "deference" should not mask the fact that the Second Circuit uses
the "data" of past Board decisions to predict what the Board will ultimately do in the case
before the court. See Silverman ex rel. NLRB v. 40-41 Realty Assocs., 668 F.2d 678, 681 (2d
Cir. 1982) ("deference is especially appropriate in [§) IO(i) cases when the prevailing legal
standard is clear and the only dispute concerns the application of that standard to a particular
set of facts.").
In 40-41 Realty, the Regional Director sought a§ I0(i) order permitting picketing under
conditions the permissibility of which had never been adjudicated. In denying the order, the
court contrasted the deference due the Board in cases in which the labor policy is well established with cases in which the Board attempts to venture outside the parameters of settled
labor policy. With respect to the latter, the court noted that
[W]hen the Regional Director asks a court to fashion a § IO(i) remedy to [permit the
picketing in question], he inverts the traditional relationship between administrative
agency and court: the court is asked to make the initial ruling as to the propriety of a
novel and unprecedented application of the statute, and thereafter the Board will apply its
expertise to the issues presented.
668 F.2d at 681 (footnote omitted). Similarly, the court in Blyer ex rel. NLRB v. New York
Coat, Suit, Dress, Rainwear and Allied Workers' Union, 522 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
observed that
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probability requirement would also minimize the risks inherent in
the issuance of a section lOG) bargaining order by insuring that such
relief will almost always be granted in cases where the Board subsequently issues a Gissel bargaining order. 136
CONCLUSION

The section lOG) bargaining order is always just in the Gissel situation. It promotes the twin goals of the NLRA, protection of the
free fl.ow of commerce and of the collective bargaining process, by
deterring and redressing unfair labor practices in a way that the
In the run-of-the-mill unfair labor practice case, as to which the NLRB has had time to
develop standards and experience and to consider the policy ramifications of its position,
a court should give great deference to the Board's determination. But in a case of first
impression, in which the NLRB is using its preliminary-injunction power to develop new
law, far less deference is appropriate.
522 F. Supp. at 727; see also Hendrix ex rel NLRB v. International Union of Operating
Engrs. Local 571, 592 F.2d 437, 442-43 (8th Cir. 1979); Humphrey v. International Longshoremen's Association, 548 F.2d 494, 498 (4th Cir. 1977).
136. See notes 82-86, 110-118 wpra and accompanying text.
Accurate prediction through comparison of past Board Gissel cases should prove feasible
for three reasons. First, the cases display recurring factual patterns. See note 131 wpra. Second, the briefs of the parties can facilitate the comparison, since the§ l0(j) and Gissel elements
overlap. See note 128 wpra. Third, the court considering the § lO(j) petition should have high
quality information from which to decide whether the petitioner is acting within the bounds of
established labor policy on the questions of severity and authorization cards. The § l 0(j) court
should be able to examine the same factual record that the Board uses to make its final decision: the record of the proceedings before the administrative law judge. See note 5 wpra.
A court considering a § lO(j) petition usually has before it the record, containing all of the
evidence introduced by the parties, of the proceedings before the administrative law judge.
See, e.g., Kaynardex rel. NLRB v. Palby Lingerie, Inc., 625 F.2d 1047, 1050-51 (2d Cir. 1980);
Seeler ex rel. NLRB v. Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1975); Fuchs ex rel. NLRB
v. Steel-Fab, Inc., 356 F.Supp. 385, 387 (D. Mass. 1973).
Questions of fact, embraced by the reasonable cause standard, see notes 14-21 wpra and
accompanying text, have not troubled the courts even where the administrative law judge's
record has been unavailable. In Gottfried ex rel NLRB v. Mayco Plastics, Inc., 472 F. Supp.
l 161, 1162 (E.D. Mich. 1979), ajfd mem, 615 F.2d 1360 (6th Cir. 1980), the employer conceded the issue of reasonable cause to believe unfair labor practices have occurred. In Levine
ex rel NLRB v. C & W Mining Co., Inc., 610 F.2d 432, 435 (6th Cir. 1979), the parties
presented conflicting evidence directly to the court instead of through the record of the proceedings before the administrative law judge. But even though the employer contended that
there was conflicting evidence, it did not "seriously [argue] that the finding of reasonable cause
was clearly erroneous." In Boire ex rel NLRB v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185,
1191 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976), the parties also presented conflicting
evidence directly to the district court instead of through the record of the proceedings before
the administrative law judge. Nevertheless, the appellate court had little trouble in concluding that the district court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and that its legal conclusions were correct.
Moreover, the Board has indicated its willingness to accept a stay of§ lO(j) proceedings
until the hearing before the administrative law judge is complete. Fuchs ex rel. NLRB v.
Hood Indus., 590 F.2d 395, 396 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1979); see also Kaynard ex rel. NLRB v. Palby
Lingerie, Inc., 625 F.2d 1047, 1050-51 (2d Cir. 1980) (Judge postponed consideration of the
§ lO(j) petition pending completion of the hearing before the administrative law judge. Parties
then stipulated that the transcript of testimony and the exhibits introduced in the administrative hearing would constitute the record in the § lO(j) proceeding.). A stay would assure the
§ l0(j) court of access to the record compiled in the proceedings before the administrative law
judge.
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Board's final order cannot. By preventing irreparable harm to the
union and its supporters while inflicting only reparable harm on
other parties, the section 100) bargaining order preserves the status
quo, establishing a set of conditions under which the Board's final
order will be effective. But a district court should not grant section
100) relief absent an additional showing that there is a high
probability that the Board will eventually issue a Gissel order. This
requirement properly preserves the Board's delegated authority to
make labor policy.

